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Aesthetic education and the theoretical foundations for its exist­
ence have not been accorded the important place in curriculum which they 
deserve. Recently, Broudy, Greene, and Macdonald have attempted to vali­
date aesthetic criticism as an alternative to scientific or statistical 
studies in curriculum. Humanistic psychologists have also provided cur­
riculum scholars with a more detailed analysis of the nature of aesthetic 
experiences in order to help systematize the study of encounters with the 
arts. 
This study examines two models of aesthetic criticism which may 
prove helpful to school curriculum supervisors inasmuch as the models can 
serve as guides to writing narrative evaluations of school arts programs. 
Also, the researcher develops a model which compares the aesthetic growth 
of the individual with the Piagetian model of cognitive development. 
Using the data on the nature of aesthetic experience, the investigator 
traces the types of aesthetic experiences a child may typically undergo 
from infancy through adolescence. 
A method of inquiry is fashioned which embodies sequence, order, and 
proof and which remains linked to artistic and literary scholarship. 
Developmental stages in aesthetic awareness are postulated which rely on 
the chronology of emergence of four types of aesthetic experiences. The 
relationship of this model to five archetypal influences in the writings 
of Plato, Schiller, Read, Dewey and Langer is discussed. Conclusive 
statements are a result of application of aesthetic criticism to the 
researcher's Parallel Model of Cognitive and Aesthetic Development. 
New syntheses are being formed between scientific and humanistic 
modes of inquiry. This study, while placed within the humanistic domain, 
suggests additional research related to the investigator's model for 
aesthetic education. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Educational research is entering a new era. The scientistic methods 
which have determined the nature of educational inquiry have been chal­
lenged by a new conception of research whose foundations are as old as 
the institutions of education themselves. The particularistic is waning 
in favor of the generalistic; the attempts to make Nature answer Man's 
questions are being superseded by the realization that we must examine 
our questions as carefully as the answers. In many instances, notably 
the works of Eisner, Smith, and Child, new syntheses between the scien­
tific and humanistic lines of inquiry are being forged.* Among the works 
of social scientists, Sarason and Brubaker have developed systematic ways 
of looking at educational and social events which emphasize the holistic 
nature of experience, not the fragmented view which statistical treat-
2 
ments sometimes offer. Yet the idea of examining the school experience 
as a whole has its pitfalls, and educational researchers have been slow 
^Elliott W. Eisner, The Educational Imagination: The Design and 
Evaluation of School Programs (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1979); Ralph 
A. Smith, ed., Aesthetics and Problems of Education (Urbana, Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1971; Irvin L. Child, Humanistic Psychology 
and the Research Tradition: Their Several Virtues (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1973). 
Seymour B. Sarason, The Creation of Settings and the Future 
Societies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1972); Dale L. Brubaker, 
"Social Studies and the Creation of Settings," Journal of Instructional 
Psychology 4 (Summer 1977): 18-25. 
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to warm to the idea. It is an assumption on the part of all researchers 
that inquiry produces intelligible results only when it is systematic, 
logically ordered, and proceeds from one premise to another by careful 
steps. It is reasonable to say that the construction of designs for 
curriculum has followed the historically prescribed path of order, se­
quence, and proof. Tyler, Taba, and Popham serve as examples of model 
builders whose curriculum design depends upon order, sequence, and 
proof. There is every reason to believe that models along traditional 
lines will continue to be constructed. The problem lies in creating new 
models which still depend upon order, sequence, and proof, but which re­
tain the spark of artistic and literary inspiration, rather than the 
formal, scientific rationales which undergird traditional models of 
curriculum design. 
The search for order, sequence, and proof in artistic curricular 
models has led many curriculum workers to examine the body of critical 
literature about the arts to determine if models of criticism may be 
applied to curriculum inquiry. Tolstoy, Ruskin, and Hegel offer nine-
4 
teenth-century systems of art criticism. Krutch, Beardsley, and Greene 
have contributed criticism and literature on criticism as they explain 
^Ralph.W. Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); Hilda Taba, Curriculum 
Development: Theory and Practice (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Inc., 1962); W. James Popham, Establishing Educational Goals 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970). 
^Leo Tolstoy, What is Art? and Essays on Art trans. Aylmer Maude 
(London: Oxford Press, 1932); John Ruskin, The Art Criticism of John 
Ruskin, ed., with introd. by Robert L. Herbert (Garden City, New Jersey: 
Anchor Books, 1964); G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art 
trans, with introd. by T. M. Knox (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 
1975). 
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their own particular styles, values, and biases.^ Others provide insights 
into the critical process by deriving models from their own work. Abrams 
and Meyer do this from two sharply differing positions.^ Abrams' work be­
longs to a lyrical prose tradition of criticism; Meyer adopts a quasi-
scientific style of analysis. Both models are useful as starting points 
in the quest for new directions in curricular inquiry. Both models may 
contribute information and possible answers to the question--is it possi­
ble to create a new model for curriculum design which retains the flavor 
of artistic and literary criticism yet embodies the order, sequence, and 
proof which educational research requires? 
To address the problem, it becomes necessary to examine existing 
models of criticism, create models from archetypal ideas (which Jung 
7 would term part of the collective unconscious, our cultural Zeitgeist) 
about education and art, and synthesize these into a flexible conceptual 
framework for curriculum design which owes its life to an aesthetic con­
ception of education. 
^Joseph Wood Krutch, Experience and Art: Some Aspects of the 
Esthetics of Literature (New York: H. Smith and R. Haas, 1932); Monroe 
C. Beardsley, ed. "Aesthetic Theory and Educational Theory" in 
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1958); Maxine Greene, Landscapes of Learning (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1978). 
H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the 
Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953); Leonard 
B. Meyer, Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in 
Twentieth-Century Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
n 
C. G. Jung, Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1955). 
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Scope, Purposes, and Intents of the Study 
This study will examine pervasive models of the aesthetic experience, 
of aesthetic criticism, and of aesthetic theories in order to synthesize 
them into a comprehensive design for an aesthetic curriculum which tran­
scends the bounds of traditional course offerings in the fine arts. The 
models to be examined will be those which, to the writer's way of think­
ing, have provided educators in this century with explicit or tacit 
philosophical directions for curricular innovation and reform. These 
models from the literature may be said to persist as "archetypes" or 
organizing principles for how we educators view the aesthetic curriculum. 
The illumination of these archetypes and comments on how they influence 
our thinking and writing about the aesthetic curriculum are designed to 
achieve the first purpose of the study. The series of essays in Chapter 
Two will develop a new conceptual framework to assist in the critiquing 
of events within the aesthetic curriculum. The third purpose of the 
study will be to help educators devise new philosophies and programs for 
aesthetic education within school settings. 
Significance of the Study 
There is some concern about the status of aesthetic education in our 
schools. There has never been a clear-cut mandate for instruction in the 
fine arts, much less for a comprehensive arts curriculum. Movements in 
this direction have been severed time and time again by social and polit­
ical contingencies like world war, Sputnik, and the drop in average Scho­
lastic Aptitude Test scores. Furthermore, current legislation focuses 
attention of the public and of educators upon basic remedial skills 
5 
which are highly cognitive in nature. There exists no disciplinary map 
for the fine arts as a whole, no standards by which school people can 
examine the quality of aesthetic life in their schools. Administrators 
continue to render lip service to fine arts curricula, yet in practice 
fail to support development and implementation with financial and per­
sonnel resources. 
This study is significant in that it will: 
1. Present information about the foundations of the 
aesthetic curriculum, 
2. Advance the conviction that a basic education con­
sists of encouraging perceptual, affective skills 
as well as logical skills, and of promoting self-
knowledge of creative capacities as well as tech­
nical proficiencies, 
3. Provide a conceptual framework which will help the 
educator explore new territory and expand old 
boundaries. 
This study is also significant in that it will treat the aesthetic 
domain as a pervasive element in schooling, a transdisciplinary experi­
encing of beauty and meaning, not as a preserve which the fine arts claim 
exclusively for themselves. The fact that this study has been placed in 
the realm of educational philosophy, and not within the limits of one of 
the fine or applied arts also contributes to the significance and unique­
ness of the views and conclusions. This is because aesthetic concerns 
pervade the entire educational field, and form a part of the social foun­
dations of school research. 
Art, like technology, is viewed as somewhat separate from everyday 
life. This is an unfortunate state of affairs, because both art and 
science are responsible for the shape of culture as well as being pro­
ducts of that culture. With this separation there coexists a mistrust 
6 
of artists, the result of centuries of artisans whose craft leaned more 
and more to decoration, and less to the production of useful articles 
for human existence. The non-quantitative measures of evaluation fall 
within this circle of distrust and suffer the same fate as aesthetic 
criticism. We have begun to see in the latter half of this century a 
synthesis between art and technology, and a flowering of aesthetic aware­
ness within the applied sciences. Man is no longer content to accept 
utility as the only criterion for the design of devices to alleviate the 
struggle for survival. As this aesthetic awareness develops, it should 
follow that the public becomes ready to accept non-quantitative research 
into the arena of acceptable data about schooling. They already accept 
this form of information as part of the political, economic, and ethical 
decision-making processes in which society engages. It is curious that 
education should be a strong bastion of quantitative evaluation. The 
aim of this study is to establish a systematic form of evaluation which 
proceeds from the aesthetic modes of understanding. 
Finally, the significance of this study also rests with the writer's 
belief that this document should be a contribution to the aesthetic life 
of the reader—it should contribute to an entente between the rational 
and aesthetic modes of valuing. As much as possible, it will try to com­
municate some unique experiences to the reader. It will succeed only to 
the extent that the dissertation is an inviting, appealing object, art 
in the fullest sense, a true effort to create and sustain beauty and 
meaning, to entertain as well as enlighten. 
7 
Definitions 
Praxis, Metaphor, and Archetype 
Several key words used in this study require an operational defini­
tion in order to clarify as well as justify their use. Definitions 
gathered from the literature will also be used; where there is ambiguity 
in the literature, or where the term's meaning has been expanded or 
limited by its use within the study, then it becomes necessary to arrive 
at a more precise account of how the word will be used. Sarason states, 
As soon as one resorts to language the process of dissection 
of experience begins, and although this is both inevitable 
and valuable, it fractionates that which is whole and the en­
suing array of part-characteristics renders difficult the task 
of understanding their strength, duration, and vicissitudes.^ 
Aesthetic criticism does not wholeheartedly endorse the fractionating of 
experience, nor does it insist that descriptions should substitute satis­
factorily for reality. Criticism does make reflection upon the aesthetic 
experience more profitable because it equips us with the images and lan­
guage to effectively communicate that experience. 
In this study, praxis will denote reflective action. When used in 
an artistic referent, it means choices made about further encounters with 
art forms based upon the nature and intensity of past encounters. When 
used in an educational referent, praxis refers to observable changes in 
choices made on the basis of aesthetic experiences within a school cur­
riculum. Teachers and students are both capable of praxis. Artists and 
audiences reflect praxis choices when the nature and intensity of the art 
object changes through technical skills or self-knowledge, or when choices 
^Sarason, Creation of Settings, p. 228. 
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are made to attend to art objects which are an extension of experiences 
with previous art. Praxis also refers to the self-knowledge gained 
through encounters with art and curriculum, when that self-knowledge re­
sults in choices to extend knowledge or to replicate experience. 
In the poetic sense, a metaphor is a highly descriptive way of con­
veying meaning, a figurative rather than a literal way of saying some­
thing. "The road was a ribbon of moonlight over the purple moor" is a 
vivid example of poetic metaphor. In a broader sense, a metaphor may be 
an art object, or a model, or an idea. In this way, a metaphor may be 
said to be an image which stands for something else. We think in meta­
phors—mental images which race across the mind. We do not tend to con­
fuse these mental images inside us with the "real thing" in the outside 
world. Nor does seeing a road at dusk normally result in our thinking 
about a ribbon of moonlight. The paradox of knowing that a metaphor is 
not "real," yet can convey a deeper, more pleasurable image than reality 
is the central concept of the separation of art and non-art. 
An archetype is a pervasive idea or concept which shapes our think­
ing about certain human interests. We are often guilty of being uncon­
scious about the influence and persistence of archetypes. One archetype 
tinder consideration in this study concerns the division of human mental 
processes into the logical and emotional.' This archetype has its roots 
in classical Greek philosophy, and is found in the works of Schiller as 
well as twentieth-century research of the split brain. C. G. Jung wrote 
that the aim of research 
is to force (Nature) to give answers to questions devised by Man. 
Every answer of Nature is therefore more or less influenced by 
the kinds of questions asked.® 
Q 
Jung, Synchronicity, p. 8. 
9 
An archetypal idea may be said to influence the kinds of questions which 
research forces Nature to answer. 
The Transdisciplinary Curriculum 
A curriculum, in the words of James Macdonald 
is the study of what should constitute a world for learning, and 
how to go about making.this world.^ 
Realizing the limitations placed upon those who would attempt to create 
this world, Macdonald refines his view to 
the school setting ... a potentially manageable microcosm of a 
rather unmanageable macrocosmic society. 
As difficult an assignment as this may appear to educators, there are 
always those of us who should make the attempt. There are certain ele­
ments of a curriculum which are more manageable than others. The extent 
to which we wish to manage rather than orchestrate the development of 
total school life—to actively promote a schoolstyle or just watch it 
grow—reveals assumptions about the persons, places, and ways of knowing 
that each of us as teachers prizes and protects. An aesthetic school-
style is one which cherishes the aesthetic experience, and actively en­
courages teachers and students to seek it. A transdisciplinary conception 
of aesthetic education recognizes that it is not only a set of plans and 
objectives drawn up to implement courses in the fine arts (although those 
plans and objectives may form part of a larger design for an aesthetic 
James B. Macdonald, "Value Bases and Issues for Curriculum" 
Curriculum Theory, eds. Alex Molnar and John A. Zahorik (Washington, 
D. C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977), 
p. 15. 
* -^Macdonald, "Value Bases," p. 28. 
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curriculum), but the way that the emotional events aligned with the larger 
curricular frame are handled. 
It was necessary to use the word "transdisciplinary" to convey the 
meaning that the aesthetic curriculum embraces concepts throughout the 
school experience. "Interdisciplinary efforts" connotes an almost forced 
detente between separate school divisions of learning. A transdiscipli­
nary view of aesthetic experiences assumes that the student will encoun­
ter forms which instruct and satisfy throughout the curriculum, and that 
these encounters will eventually be seen by individuals as desirable for 
themselves wherever they occur—and that the ends of learning are not the 
accumulation and ordering of facts and meanings, but the broadening and 
deepening of one's desire to have aesthetic experiences over a wide range 
of human interests and endeavors. 
Models and Design 
The term "model" has its limitations for description in aesthetics, 
but it also has advantages which make it a desirable word to explore. An 
inaccurate use of the word "model" is as a synonym for theory. A theory 
must give an account of the "why" of an event or series of events. The 
purpose of theory is explanation, even if this explanation is founded 
upon hypothesis alone. For example, a theory of aesthetic education in 
part must explain how schools become responsible for passing judgment on 
some art forms—that is, why some forms are included in the curriculum of 
the public schools, and why some are excluded. We generally expect that 
students will receive musical training in the secondary school in a large 
ensemble, such as chorus or band; it is less of an expectation that the 
11 
student will receive training in a homogeneous ensemble, or a small 
group, such as trombone choir or barbershop quartet. Few schools offer 
such experiences as a part of the organized, approved course of study for 
credit. A theory of aesthetic education must, in the traditional sense, 
explain this phenomenon through philosophic, pragmatic, or political 
assumptions based on observation. A model of aesthetic education as it 
happens will not explain, but describe. That is, a design must be gene­
rated which shows how these bands, choruses, trombone choirs, or barber­
shop quartets contribute to the growth of the individual through their 
interactions in his environment. 
Models, like theories, are built upon assumptions. It is in making 
these assumptions about models that we create a true or distorted picture 
about what is taking place in schools. Given the band/trombone choir 
example above, one could assume that band is offered because it is intrin­
sically "better" as an art form than a trombone choir. One could also 
assume that band is offered instead of a trombone class because it at­
tracts more students, and is, therefore, more economically prudent. To 
the extent that assumptions about models are explicit in their value 
positions—that is, what the model builder believes is good and true for 
a curriculum—then that model will also be accurate in its portrayal of 
an event as the model builder sees it. For this reason, a model is never 
bias-free. 
Skill is model building—showing the "how" of something—consists of 
being able to show the parameters of the model builder's concerns about 
referents such as curricular events. 
the formation of a model consists in conceptually marking off a 
perceptual complex . . . Every model is a pattern of symbols, 
12 
rules, and processes regarded as matching, in part or in totality, 
an existing perceptual complex. Each model stipulates, thus, some 
correspondence with reality, some relevance of items in the model 
to reality, and some verifiability between model and reality.^ 
To add to Meadows' excellent description of the model, the "existing 
perceptual complex" must include also the model builder's assumptions 
about the curriculum. In aesthetic criticism, any model which does not 
include this explicit caveat is limited and perhaps even misleading. 
A formal model can devise, but it can also explicate and evalu­
ate. To explicate is not to contribute to theory, but it is to 
clarify and complete theory. To evaluate is not to contribute 
to theory, but is to determine the objects falling within the 
range of the characterization of theory.13 
It is clear in Maccia's view that model building is not theory building. 
Yet models derive from theory, as well as show designs which help imple­
ment theory. Thus models contribute to knowledge in that they show 
events from a pragmatic viewpoint, and serve as replicative agents by 
the efficacy and suitability of their design. There are two orders of 
models, as Maccia describes them: 
To be a model of is to represent something, and to be a model 
for is to be represented in something. (Emphasis mine) 
a model which is a representation (is) a 'first-order model1: 
and a model which is being represented is a 'second-order 
model'.I4 
As esoteric as the distinction between first- and second-order models may 
appear, it becomes important to the study to distinguish between the two 
and constantly cast models under criticism into one light or another. 
l^Paul Meadows, "Models, Systems, and Science," American Sociologi­
cal Review 22 (Spring 1957): 88. 
^Elizabeth Steiner Maccia, Models and the Meaning of Retroduction 
Paper #62-110 (Columbus, Ohio": Foundations Division, Bureau of Educa­
tional Research and Service, 1962), p. 10. 
14Ibid., p. 4-5. 
13 
For example, a teacher looking at a "model curriculum," such as the 
widely acclaimed Evanston Township Plan, is seeing a representation of an 
event—a first-order model. That teacher may wish to use that plan as a 
replicative agent, that is, a plan for his own curriculum. In this sense, 
the Evanston Township Plan is a model for, or a second-order model. Those 
responsible for writing the Evanston Township Plan did so after years of 
trial and error in classroom settings; what they wrote down during their 
experiences teaching there is a representation of something—a first-order 
model. The sets of assumptions held by the teacher viewing that document 
as a second-order model are materially different from the assumptions of 
those who wrote the model with the benefit of hindsight. The inability 
of educators to view aesthetic curricula as first- or second-order models 
leads to frustration in the classroom. Many teachers accept state-
adopted texts as first-order models, yet when used as second-order models 
in a curriculum, as plans for school learning experiences, the texts fall 
short of expectations. Educators often do not recognize the difference 
between models, a difference not in the plan or model itself, but in the 
use it is put to by various individuals with various assumptions, whose 
"perceptual complexes" are influenced by the function the model serves in 
their lives. 
So we have seen that the model, the design, plan, or document itself 
is only a part of what must be considered in model building. The taking 
into account of the assumptions of the model builder and the model user 
must also form part of the critique of making and using models in curric­
ulum studies. So to extend Meadows' description, each model stipulates 
1. some correspondence with reality, 
2. some relevance of items in the model to reality, 
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3. some verifiability between model and reality, 
4. some accounting of the model builder's position with the 
model—as recorder (first-order) or as implementer 
(second-order). 
In this study, a model may be either first or second order, or both 
at the same time, depending on the purpose of the reader or creator of 
the model. Since the model is basically a map—a picture or an image of 
an event, frozen in time, committed to paper for the purpose of capturing 
the essential features and interactions of ideas or concepts within the 
event, it can be inferred that several kinds of pictures will emerge. 
The first set of pictures can be called status models. They attempt to 
show how things are, how things operate; the picture is two-dimensional 
in that relationships are static or stopped in time. Examples of status 
models are Maslow's hierarchy of needs: 
Fig. 1. 
Design of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
and Brubaker's model of the creation-of-settings process (the amoeba). 
Fig. 2. 
Design of Brubaker's Creation-of-Settings Model 
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Both models are concerned with a single design; both show an image of a 
series of events, which in reality never exist two-dimensionally, but can 
be rendered stationary for purposes of analysis or evaluation. 
The second set of pictures includes models which try to put inter­
connected events into three dimensions, which try to add the feeling of 
movement or process. The dialectic or conflict resolution model shows 
how two ideas interact to inevitably lead to a third idea or event, a 
synthesis of the first two: 
The pictures now begin to become more complicated, as the model maker 
tries to expand the model figures artistically. Another type of model 
which shows a progression from one state to another is the heuristic 
model, exemplified by the spiral or the ziggurat. To ascend from one 
event or idea through others to a final concept or theory (which in it­
self may be the starting point for another model) is shown like this: 
r\y\y\ 
Pig. 3. 
Design for a Conventional Dialectical Model 
Fig. 4. Fig. 5 
Two Heuristic Designs 
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Whether one ascends or descends the ziggurat, or travels inward or outward 
upon the spiral, is not solely a directional or semantic distinction. To 
arrive at self-knowledge, to illuminate a tacit assumption, the proper 
direction upon the spiral, metaphorically, would be inward. Similarly, 
the refining of theory would show an upward climb upon the ziggurat, as a 
search for program rationales through observation would be indicated by 
downward travel. There is a symbolic archetype in human experience which 
has us reaching up for knowledge, looking within for reflection, settling 
down to tasks, and stretching outward for understanding. The upward-
downward and inward-outward metaphors of the ziggurat and spiral models 
make them convenient to use in dealing with the directionality of learn­
ing. 
The final model design has to do with expansion into four dimensions, 
and here it becomes necessary to invite the reader to imagine the model, 
not on paper, but perhaps in the air before his eyes. The zetetic models 
postulated by Tykociner^ deal with the ordering of recorded knowledge and 
the expansion of that knowledge by the individual, and include information 
on how that knowledge can be used to change himself. The model speaks of 
an inner core or recorded (memorized) knowledge expanding through certain 
phases of consciousness and ending not as a core, but as a shell. The 
metaphor which cannot be shown on paper is that of the stellar universe, 
/• 
proceeding from a dense core of super-heated material, exploding to fill 
space, moving outwardly in all directions at once, simultaneously giving 
birth to new stars and solar systems. This model shows the influence of 
1%. Tykociner, "Zetetics and Areas of Knowledge," Education and the 
Structure of Knowledge, ed. Stanley Elam (Chicago: Rand, McNally Co., 
1964). 
17 
the archetypal outward movement for growth and control, just as science's 
description of the expanding universe is the result of archetypal think­
ing. As a simple, single frame of film is inadequate to capture this 
motion, so paper and pencil fail to render the outward motion, the inexo­
rable burgeoning of the universe of personal knowledge. This is the most 
regrettable flaw in the zetetic type of model. Two dimensions fail to 
catch the essence of its multi-dimensionality. The closest attempt to 
concretize a zetetic model would be through the use of the cinema or a 
continuous hologrammatic projection. 
The paper-and-pencil sketches known as models form only a part of 
the kind of models used in curriculum studies. They serve as corollary 
metaphors in criticism, as they assist the reader to form mental images 
of the way events and ideas interact and evolve. Models tend to follow 
archetypes of upward-downward and inward-outward directions. Designs 
after the fact are representative of something: first-order models. All 
of the designs in this section are of this type, because they are derived 
from events; an existing perceptual complex has been clarified or sche­
matized by adding a sketch. Any of these models could be used as a 
second-order model, that is, to influence the way some future event might 
be planned. 
Praxis as an Element of Aesthetic Education 
Each encounter with art forms has certain characteristics which 
separate that encounter from other, more prosaic experiences which make 
up the majority of human endeavors. While the nature of the aesthetic 
18 
experience will be described in a later section, one desirable result of 
that experience is that the person, as participator in an art form, will 
make more or less enlightened judgments about that form, and will seek to 
replicate or avoid further experiences with that form. While art, like 
war and women, has often been described as being all things to all men, 
it is clear that some encounters with art will result in the wish to 
avoid the particular form under consideration. Other interactions with 
art will prompt the beholder to seek newer, fresher experiences with the 
same work or others of its kind. As educators see students consistently 
making choices about art forms, and acting upon those choices, it can be 
inferred that praxis—reflective action--has taken place. Praxis becomes 
more effective for the person as his principles for choice-making become 
broader and deeper. This repertoire of principles generally emerges from 
past experiences and past efforts at praxis in a circular fashion. The 
more diverse the art forms the person encounters, the greater the range 
of choices available to him; the more intense the interaction, the more 
likely that a particular form or genre will be selected or avoided in the 
future, according to the pleasure involved in the original interaction. 
A person hearing selections from an opera on an inadequate sound system, 
in a classroom that is poorly lit and ventilated, in the presence of 
others whose company may exert a disrupting influence, may make judgments 
about the music which are not totally the result of a musical experience. 
If his experience stops there, he may not choose to hear that music again. 
Should the same student find, himself in the audience at a performance of 
the same opera, his interaction with that same piece of art will be sub­
stantially different from the encounter in the classroom. If that same 
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person is given the opportunity to actually participate in a performance 
of that opera, his subsequent decisions to repeat or avoid the event are 
colored by the intense nature of the experience he had. So praxis in 
art—the decision to increase or decrease further participation with art 
forms—is fashioned by: 
1. The nature of the encounter 
1.1 as a participator or creator 
1.2 as a critical member of an audience (the person is 
required to make analytical statements about the work) 
1.3 as a casual member of an audience (the person is not 
required to make analytical statements about the work) 
2. The intensity of the encounter 
2.1 in performance, all the logical and motor capacities 
are engaged 
2.2 as a critical audience, the logical capacities are 
called upon 
2.3 as a casual audience, a person may respond to art 
through emotional channels, as well as through motor 
activities 
3. The kinds of knowledge the person may have gained through 
the encounter 
3.1 the student may learn something about art forms 
3.2 the student may learn something about the feelings 
and experiences of other persons 
3.3 the student may learn something about himself 
Four young people had the opportunity to watch many performances of an 
outdoor drama several summers ago. At that time, they may be said to 
have had interactions with that art form like 1.3, 2.3, and 3.1 above. 
As their summer progressed, it was apparent through their continued de­
sire to witness the play, the kinds of questions they asked about it, and 
the kinds of relationships they developed with the members of the cast, 
that their modes of interaction were changing to 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 and 
3.3. The next summer, each youngster chose to audition for and partici­
pate in the drama. As participators in actual performances, each talked 
about how different it felt to be on stage, rather than in an audience 
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(1.1), how much more physically and emotionally taxing, yet satisfying 
their roles were (2.1), and what kinds of things they had learned about 
their own abilities in theater (3.3). Yet not all chose to repeat the 
creative experience in theater during the third summer: two remained on 
stage, two decided to "work the house" at the amphitheater in other jobs. 
What had appeared to be four children undergoing the same experience, was 
really four different episodes with four different consequences. Each 
based subsequent praxis upon the unique constellation of value decisions 
derived from the nature and intensity of the encounter, and the knowledge 
gained from it. So while art may strive to be all things to all men, 
praxis in art will be different for each person, as that person is diffe­
rent from others. The outline above provides only a starting point from 
which to discuss the multitude of variables involved in examining reflec­
tive action based on art forms. 
The Aesthetic Dimension in Education: 
Theory and Experience 
Any definition of the word "aesthetic," when used among artists or 
aestheticians, will probably precipitate more argument than agreement. 
As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics is fairly new, having its genesis 
as a discipline in the world of post-Enlightenment Germany. Baumgarten, 
Kant, and Schiller are frequently credited with giving aesthetic theory 
a place in philosophical scholarship, and refining the models of aesthe­
tic inquiry beyond comments on taste and style to include the search for 
underlying principles throughout all art forms. Nineteenth-century 
aesthetic theory focused on the role of the artist, and began to posit 
questions like: 
What is the aim of art? 
Should art concern itself with morality? 
Should art be used to entertain or instruct? 
What should the artist say through art about life, art, politics? 
These questions remain unanswerable to this day, giving our twentieth-
century aesthetic philosophers some material for reflection. Yet 
aesthetic theorizing has advanced beyond the concerns of pure philosophy 
into the realms of science and politics with questions like: 
What kinds of forms are art, and what kinds are not? 
What is the psychology of perception, and how can artists use it? 
What forums are available for artists, and who controls them? 
It is possible to see how the concerns of aesthetics are influenced by 
the cultural Zeitgeist. As the problems of culture are explicated 
through art, so does aesthetic theory transform the experiencing of art 
into cultural influence through the continuing process of art criticism. 
If explanations for the impact of art works and the experiences they 
produce finally succeed, it is hoped they will do nothing to lessen the 
mystery and beauty of the aesthetic experiences humans have. 
Traditional aesthetic theory confines its inquiry to art forms. 
To define beauty, not in the most abstract, but in the most 
concrete terms possible, is the aim of the student of 
aesthetics. 
This task may seem impossible, but each of us fulfills it to our satis­
faction each time we encounter art. Our likes and dislikes are based 
upon a fluid set of expectations about art, however informed or naive. 
Wie are all amateur theorists when it comes to art. 
^Walter Pater, The Renaissance, ed. Kenneth Clark (Cleveland, Ohio: 
World Books, 1961), p. 181. 
Aesthetic theory also forms the basis for appreciation and criticism 
of art works. Using a set of rather sophisticated expectations, critical 
inquiry happens weekly in the local newspapers. Whether or not the pro­
fessional critic is aware of the nuances of aesthetic philosophy is 
apparent in the style and content of his criticism: how he uses the 
technical language of the genre, which concerns he addresses, and the 
importance he attaches to the artist, work, universal ideas, and the 
audience. Usually (and unfortunately) media critics base their work on 
assumptions which are somewhat narrow in their formalistic view. To 
critique with insight and skill demands an understanding of traditional 
and revisionist aesthetic theory, and a willingness to go beyond the 
technical evaluation of performance (the violas were out of tune) to a 
theorizing about the moral and political aspects of the performer's 
choice of work (why are the Wagner music dramas rarely heard in Miami 
Beach?), the awareness *of the audience (the high schoolers did not grasp 
the implications of John Cage's 4' 35"), and the efforts of the performer 
to involve the audience in his unique view of the art work (why is there 
no verbal communication between the symphony conductor and the audience, 
but so much between audience and performers at rock concerts?). 
Aesthetic theory can be expanded to treat with human endeavors other 
than art. The key idea was expressed by Krutch: he felt that the domain 
of aesthetic theorizing extended to whatever is not found in Nature, yet 
is treated as real.*7 Thus, our modern conception of aesthetic inquiry 
extends to most human interests, with the exception of the natural world. 
The basic question in such exercises in criticism is how to deal with the 
•^Krutch, Experience and Art, p. 28. 
variety of forms: their suitability to a situation, their elegance, 
economy, and effectiveness, their variations and similarities, their 
proliferation, their use as archetypal models for other forms, their 
morality and meaning for the persons who live in and work with them. 
We are considering not only the forms of architecture, nourishment, 
clothing, transportation, and the like, but also the forms our inter­
actions with these items take, and the forms our personal and cultural 
choices impose upon their implementation. As much as any other disci­
plinary mode of inquiry, the new conception of aesthetics is a barometer 
for the changing social environment, and a foundation for inquiry into 
the human condition. 
As we continue to speak of art, curriculum, and the aesthetic do­
main, it is well to remember that traditional ideas of art have been 
expanded to include the creative efforts of persons in many disciplines 
whose efforts produce forms which delight and enchant us, as well as in­
form and amaze. 
The aesthetic experience, bracketed apart from the everyday, still 
has its foundations in the commonplace images of life. As well as in 
art, the areas of religion, labor, learning, and morality possess an 
aesthetic dimension, which when considered allows judgments based not 
only upon logic, but also upon a sense of the beautiful. Thus, it can be 
asserted that art, and the possibility of aesthetic inquiry, exist every­
where in human life. In the panorama of human interests, each event 
calls for a response from our sense of the beautiful, as well as from our 
sense of the' good, just, and true. 
At the heart of learning, for the aesthetic educator, lies the 
aesthetic experience: a recognizable yet intangible moment, a fleeting 
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synthesis of the logical and emotional capacities. The moment is of 
great import to the person, yet worthless in itself, except in that it 
points to other moral or ethical judgments. The aesthetic experience 
informs the social, political, and educational realms of judgment because 
it is capable of revealing to us our fantasies and fears, doubts and ex­
pectations; it is potentially a purifier of the imagic storehouse of the 
consciousness, ridding us of faded stereotypes and tired metaphors; it can 
be as a mirror to the beholder, a means of comparison between the atti­
tudes and beliefs of individuals.*® In these three ways, the aesthetic 
moment sustains, clarifies, and alters our thoughts and actions. The 
self-renewal which proceeds from the aesthetic state should enliven the 
decisions of moral action or praxis, and should enrich the logical and 
emotional capacities from which it springs. 
Where there has been no perceived connection between the art. pro­
cess, the art object, and moral behavior, herein is proposed a new con­
ception. It is based upon the status of knowledge about the aesthetic 
experience, the intentionality of the artist, and the role of praxis in 
the growth of the person. If the intent of art, according to revisionist 
aesthetic theory, is both to communicate a unique view by the artist as 
well as provide an ambiguous object to focus those views, the art object 
becomes a map for praxis, that is, something which calls for the partici­
pator in art to fill in the blanks--engage in praxis. The participator 
commits himself to action by the very fact that he has witnessed the art 
work—further decisions to reflection depend partly upon the effectiveness 
18 
Harry Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing: An Essay on Aesthetic 
Education (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1972). 
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of the art work in communicating a unique view, and partly upon the will­
ingness of the participator to act on the basis of that view. 
Sontag posits that the aesthetic experience assists moral judgments 
in the following ways: 
1. That morality proceeds from decisions made consciously, 
after reflection upon alternatives, 
2. That our responses to art are moral responses—"the 
quickening of our sensibilities and the enlivening of 
our consciousness," 
3. That this enlivening nourishes our capacities for moral 
choice making, and prompts our readiness to choose a 
course of moral action, 
4. That these choices are prerequisite to moral behavior, 
5. That moral action indicates the development of judgment 
based on an ethical system which prizes images of the 
good, just, true, and beautiful. 
Assuming that an aesthetic experience has taken place for the par­
ticipator in art, Sontag expects that intense interactions with art help 
persons develop capacities for moral judgment which vary in kind and de­
gree from the judgments of persons with limited aesthetic experiences. 
It is important to distinguish between capacity and behavior at this 
point; one is always reminded of the use to which the Wagner music dramas 
were put in the notorious prison camps at Belsen, Auschwitz, and There-
sienstadt. 
Recent writers in aesthetic philosophy have attempted to refine a 
description of consciousness in the aesthetic mode. The model of 
aesthetic experience postulated by Beardsley has an interesting parallel 
in the work of John Dewey. This similarity of ideas about aesthetic 
•*%usan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1966), p. 25. 
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experience and learning suggests that aesthetic theory and educational 
philosophy share many points, and that the stimulation of inquiry across 
disciplinary lines could be of mutual benefit to art and education. To 
the question "to what extent and in what respects can the aesthetic ex­
perience serve as a model for the educational experience?" Beardsley re­
plies: 
a) It (the aesthetic experience) involves attention to a portion 
of the phenomenally objective field, either sensuous (such as the 
colors in a painting) or intentional (such as the events in a 
novel), and to its elements and internal relationship. 
b) It involves an awareness of forms, i.e., relationships among 
the elements of a phenomenal field, especially Cbut not exclusively) 
relationships of similarity/contrast, and serial order ... it in­
volves perceiving the field as a stratified design, in which a com­
plex appears to have a certain unity just because of the relation­
ships among the parts of which it is (or appears to have been) 
composed. 
c) It involves an awareness of regional quality . . . simple 
qualities of complexes, and especially (but not exclusively) those 
qualities which are described by words taken over metaphorically 
from human contexts. The class of regional qualities corresponds 
roughly to these aesthetic concepts . . . beauty, elegance, grace, 
dignity, irony, wit, frivolity. 
d) It is characterized by a fairly high degree of unity in com­
parison with everyday, ordinary experiences. Unity has two dis­
tinguishable parts: coherence and completeness. An aesthetic 
experience is unusually coherent, in that the various perceptions, 
feelings, inferences, recognitions, memories, desires, etc., that 
occur in the course of its development . . . have a character of 
belonging or fitting together, or succeeding one another with con­
tinuity. An aesthetic experience is unusually complete in that 
the experience marks itself off fairly definitely from other exper­
iences—both from contemporaneous items of awareness that do not be­
long to it, and from other experiences that precede it or follow it. 
e) It is intrinsically gratifying, or, in other words, brings 
with it a lingering enjoyment that is felt as part of the develop­
ment of the experience, and a final satisfaction or fulfillment 
that may linger long after the experience has ended. 0 
^Beardsley, "Aesthetic Theory," p. 9-10. 
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In the Deweyan model of educational experience, the teacher-artist 
creates an aesthetic object (the learning environment) where the atten­
tion of the audience (students) is engaged, and their imagination stimu­
lated to inquiry by the ambiguous relationships of elements within the 
environment. Dewey speaks of "having an experience" as a situation with 
a unity, where every successive part flows freely, continually, and which 
runs its course to fulfillment. 
"Its close is a consummation, and not a cessation. Such experi­
ence is a whole, and carried with it its own individualizing 
quality and self-sufficiency. 
The educational experience shares many traits in common with the aesthetic 
experience. In both, the learner may perceive with particular clarity the 
nature of relationships within a whole, completeness and coherence of the 
events at hand, regional or emotional qualities, and feelings of satis­
faction or fulfillment. Aesthetic experiences which produce feelings of 
disquiet and dissatisfaction are useful in their own way, and often act 
as a powerful stimulus to inquiry, reflection, and action. 
01 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 
1934), p. 54. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This review of the literature has a dual purpose: first, to estab­
lish the existence of several families of scholarship in aesthetic 
philosophy and related disciplines, and second, to explore the relation­
ships between these families and to assess their influence upon the model 
presented in Chapter Three. The review is organized into three essays. 
The first essay concerns aesthetic criticism and will justify it as an 
alternative methodology to scientific inquiry. Three models of criticism 
will be examined and examples of their use will be cited. The second es­
say will deal with creativity and hedonism and their part in the aesthetic 
experience. Essay three covers the creation-of-settings model and the 
relation of aesthetic theory to social action. 
Aesthetic Criticism as a Methodology 
Any study of a set of points, any construction of a conceptual frame­
work, any design for or of a model, or any work of art, may be said to 
proceed from a tacit or explicit value base, through a concretization into 
a physical form, into a set of repercussions for the creator, the partici­
pator or viewer, and the critic. Often we forget that art--as well as 
instruction--proceeds from a set of life experiences which in their viva­
cious reality create subsidiary, ephemeral events in whose vicarious 
nature we relive and perpetuate the original emotions and feelings of the 
primary artistic or curricular form. 
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Works of art are constructions serving to arrange fragments of 
observation and experience into patterns which are pleasing 
because they are understandable in terms of human thought and 
consistent in terms of human feeling.^2 
These subsidiary events, the residue of contact with art and curriculum, 
are the expressive building blocks from which effective criticism is 
built. To attempt criticism solely upon objective forms, the so-called 
formal elements of art or curriculum, denies the importance of the par­
ticipator or audience. Like the example of the tree falling soundlessly 
in the forest, would there still be art and curricula if there were no 
one to experience them? The aim of aesthetic criticism, then, is to 
expand the artistic experience by illuminating those vicarious feelings, 
desires, emotions, satisfactions, and ambiguities which the audience 
derives from contact with art. The intent is to allow the viewer to see 
the building blocks as well as the edifice. Each piece of criticism will 
be a unique work; each critic will see the edifice in a different way. 
Each piece of criticism will employ a methodology most suited to the 
nature of the particular aesthetic event under consideration. If the 
critic shares an aesthetic experience with the poet, playwright, or 
pianist, 
any attempt to describe it must involve something personal . . . 
that now so-much-despised something which was once admiringly 
described as 'the adventures of a soul among masterpieces' .^ 
Yet aesthetic criticism as a methodology is not without its dimen­
sion of systematic rigor. It is also not without its uses as an obser­
vational tool in areas like curriculum theorizing which seek to point 
^Krutch, Experience and Art, p. 101-102. 
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out the social, moral, and ethical foundations of schooling. Educational 
philosophy and evaluation depended upon criticism for decades. Only in 
this country, in this latter half of the century, have sociometric and 
statistical models been borrowed from other disciplines for use in edu­
cational evaluation. Now educational critics are called upon to justify 
their craft on the basis of its replicability. Aesthetic criticism has 
some distinct advantages over scientistic methodologies because the rich, 
descriptive nature of its narrative more effectively communicates the 
subsidiary vicarious emotional events which take place in art and school­
ing. The mode or style of criticism may be replicable: the unique re­
sults vary from critic to critic. 
There are two models of aesthetic criticism which bear examination 
as good examples of descriptive methodology. The first, that of Joseph 
Wood Krutch, places critical writing upon a continuum of possible per­
sonal involvement with the art form. 
Interpretation -Impression Impersonality »• 
Fig. 6 
A Continuum of Critical Styles (Based on Krutch) 
A critic who attempts an interpretation of a work of art does so 
from an explicit personal value base. Using Picasso's Guernica as an 
example, a critic interpreting that work may view it as an anti-war 
statement, since he sees in the twisted figures and bloated human and 
. animal parts a vivid description of the aftermath of war. His interpre­
tation is purposive—it views art in relation to the values he holds. A 
critic who uses interpretational criticism works within the social milieu 
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which nurtured him in order to diagnose the posture of the artist, and to 
prescribe reactions for viewers. Interpretation can be a form of social 
criticism, because it draws moral, "ought" relationships between the 
artist, the work, the critic, and the audience. 
Critics who offer impressions of artistic events choose a different 
value orientation. They wish to advance the notion that the worth of art 
resides in the effect it has upon the viewer. With himself at the center 
of the aesthetic experience, the impressionist critic often muses about 
the feelings and emotions a particular aesthetic event inspires. His 
commentary is sometimes verbose and rambling. Its intent is to assist 
each viewer to experience art as an illumination of personal values. A 
critic using an impressionistic mode to examine Guernica uses expressive 
language to convey a sense of the emotions which the painting evokes 
within himself. These emotions are drawn from the universal human ex­
perience, and contribute back to the enrichment of human life as the 
readers of criticism compare their feelings with those of the critic. 
The horror of the bombing of the Basque village is but an example of the 
suffering humans endure. The important aspect of this type of criticism 
is its ability to give voice to the emotions which the artist has silently 
created within the viewer. Like interpretational criticism, impression­
istic styles have their prescriptive dimension, but it is a personal 
rather than a social one. These criticisms acknowledge the unique nature 
of each encounter with art. Impressionistic criticism assumes that each 
participator in art forms can articulate the emotional impact which art 
has. It does not stress the verbalization of the formal, structural 
qualities of art, nor does it prize the ability of the viewer to analyze 
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art in those terms. Impressionistic criticism like that of John Ruskin 
is heavily laden with description (the what), but not with explanation 
(the why). Much criticism of this variety was accomplished before the 
study of psychology developed models of perception. Recently, there has 
been a return to an introspective art criticism. Now, however, armed 
with the formidable vocabulary of the research in perception and emotion, 
it is quite a different criticism from its post-Romantic predecessor. 
The doctrine of impersonality, or objectivism, would have us believe 
that we can come to know art through attending to its form, and that 
therefore the proper posture of the critic is that of an evaluator of the 
separate elements within the artistic whole. This is akin to the educa­
tor who believes that the nature of schooling can be examined by looking 
at students' grades, achievement scores, teacher morale according to 
measures such as the Purdue Inventory, and so on. The objectivist critic 
eschews a value base, but there are values operating, if they are not 
apparent. This "New Wave" of criticism treats the emotional aspects of 
art as emanating from the unique combination of design elements within a 
work. An objectivist studying Guernica would attempt to ascribe the ef­
fect of the work to the balance, colors, textures, and shapes used by 
Picasso. The objectivist critic would argue that our cultural condition­
ing to certain nuances of design within Guernica should produce exactly 
the aesthetic effect desired by Picasso. While inflating the importance 
of technical design in creating emotional response in art, this mode of 
criticism often ignores the variety of response for the issue of con­
ditioning to technical development itself. Leonard B. Meyer offers an 
excellent example of objectivist criticism. His is a persuasive view of 
the effectiveness of form in communicating musical ideas. In comparing a 
phrase from J. S. Bach's Little Fugue in g with a similar phrase from a 
work by Geminiani, Meyer demonstrates that forms which tend to frustrate 
rather than fulfill expectations are superior to forms which require less 
effort from the listener to "fill in the blanks." To Meyer, elements 
which have ambiguous meaning are better than those which are immediately 
self-evident. Meyer bases his argument that the Bach is a better work 
than the Geminiani upon the fact that the melodic line in the Bach does 
not reach its goal immediately, thus involving the listener's mental ef­
forts to a higher degree.2^ While seeming to acknowledge the importance 
of perception and conditioning in music listening behavior, Meyer never­
theless makes the point that regardless of individual differences in per­
ception and conditioning to musical events, the effects of a well-turned 
phrase or effective visual composition will fall within predictable 
bounds for the great majority of individuals in any audience. Thus the 
superiority of form and the predictability of perception is the central 
concept around which an objective, impersonal style of criticism evolves. 
The work of M. H. Abrams provides still another analytic model for 
aesthetic criticism. In Abrams1 design, criticism is a way in which the 
critic or viewer can extend his personal involvement in the art form by 
increasing his awareness of the relationships the art form has to the 
artist, to the universal ideas it embodies or evokes, and to the audience 
to which it is presented. 
2^Meyer, Music, The Arts, and Ideas, p. 25. 
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UNIVERSE 
WORK OF ART 
> AUDIENCE ARTIST 
Fig. 7. 
nc 
Relations of Elements in Critical Writing 
The critic is required, when using Abrams' model, to explore re­
lationships and levels of awareness between universal ideas and the 
artist, the artist and the audience (of major importance in contemporary 
arts and letters), and between the audience and the universal ideas they 
confront in art. Criticism is systematized through four concepts: 
1. The work of art has value only in relation to humans and 
their ideas, 
2. The artist and the audience form covenants of belief, and 
the nature of these covenants reveals much about the work 
of art, 
3. The artist has an obligation to "tie into" universal ideas 
while communicating personal ideas, 
4. The participator in art grows into the role of critic as 
his ability to "tie into" universal ideas increases through 
understanding. 
Abrams' model assumes that the critic has wide experiences with art 
forms—the best experiences being the most direct, as creator or re-
creator of art, like a poet or musician. Those who have no direct ex­
periences with art are encouraged to develop a proficiency with the 
Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 10. 
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language of the art forms being critiqued. Abrams also stresses the art­
like quality of good criticism—his own writing demonstrates an expertise 
in using the expressive qualities of language. Criticism using Abrams1 
model is an exercise in descriptive comparison and contrast. The critic 
uses a connoisseur's judgment in setting up a network of relationships 
which remain in potential flux because of the arbitrary nature of the 
design. Another critic, using the same model, might create a different 
design because of his choice to explore some relationships more deeply 
than others. Each person using Abrams* model needs to see himself as an 
important factor in the critical methodology—a catalyst for the ideas 
and concepts he must bring to the study of art forms. 
It can be seen that an aesthetic methodology may be fashioned which 
combines descriptive freedom with scholastic rigor, which makes clear 
relationships while acknowledging the fluidity and ambiguity of these 
conclusions. Thus, to bring aesthetic criticism to curricular forms, 
the student of aesthetic methodology must: 
1. Attempt vivid description through literary means, including 
the use of metaphors and anecdotes, the drawing of defini­
tions, and the derivation of models, 
2. Apply these definitions, models, and metaphors to educa­
tional phenomena in a systematic way, 
3. Attend to the value base of the definitions, models, and 
metaphors in their historical contexts as well as in the 
here and now, 
4. Forge conclusions based upon comparisons using the poles of 
universal ideas, works of art, the artist, and the audience 
(educational philosophy, specific curricula, the teacher, 
and the students), 
5. Cast these conclusions in a conceptual framework which ade­
quately describes the relationships of the four elements 
above, and 
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6. Imbue that framework with a flexibility or ambiguity which 
can make it useful as a critical tool in other curricular 
or artistic situations; the final product should remain 
within the spirit of "art (as) a realm of human freedom; 
it is perpetually being remodeled in accordance with human 
desires." ̂  It is wise for us to remember that "mystery 
is an essential element of any work of art." 
Creativity and Hedonism 
In this essay, several dimensions of creativity will be examined and 
explicated: perception, process, and product will be fit into the model 
of aesthetic education which is being built. Hedonism, or the pleasure 
factor in the aesthetic experience, will also be traced through the lit­
erature . 
Perception, as a scientistic model, consists of a number of fragmen­
ted abstract reactions to environmental and subjective stimuli. In an 
aesthetic model, perception is a fluid, changeable process, capable of 
being trained or manipulated by the perceiver. The person can change his 
or her method or way of perceiving and organizing environmental and sub­
jective events. One may also choose to reorganize the perceptions of 
others through aesthetic means; this reorganization of perception may 
well be a major aim of the artist as he or she creates an art object or 
event. The teacher in the aesthetic model attempts to help students with 
this reorganization. Altered states of consciousness which proceed in a 
natural fashion from these changes in perception help students become 
aware of connections between self and events which may have gone unnoticed 
Krutch, Experience and Art, p. 96. 
2^Luis Bunuel, quoted by Penelope Gilliatt, "Interview with Luis 
Bunuel" The New Yorker, November 24, 1977, p. 54. 
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in more ordinary modes of perception. 
Below are two scenarios in which some sixth-grade students partici 
pated. 
Scenario I 
The students approached the door 
of the media center with antici­
pation and nervousness. Each 
quietly chose one partner. 
Peering around the door frame, 
one pair scurried across the 
lobby of the school and dived 
for cover against the wall by 
the principal's office. Crouch­
ing, hands nearly to the floor, 
they hurried past the office 
door, underneath the window. 
Escaping detection so far, one 
scuttled under a bench, the 
other headed for a hiding place 
inside the alcove leading to the 
boys' rest room. So far, their 
reconnaissance was successful— 
no one was on the hall, no one 
had seen them. Another steal­
thy pair shot out of the media 
center door, across the lobby; 
the first pair flattened them­
selves against the wall and 
inched back down the corridor. 
Stooping below door windows, 
they progressed back toward 
the media center as their com­
panions made their way in the 
opposite direction. Two 
teachers coming off break 
opened the door of the lounge 
and stepped into the hall. 
They spied the second pair, 
bodies flat against the wall, 
arms and legs splayed out, 
heads well back and chests 
heaving from fear. "What is 
going on out here?" The first 
pair spotted the teachers and 
launched themselves silently 
from their lair across the 
Scenario II 
The hall was quiet. At 10:15 on a 
Friday morning, the usual bustling 
activity of the primary wing momen­
tarily ceased. It was as if the 
school had become a giant cat, 
muscles tensed and twitching, wait­
ing to pounce on lunch. A pair of 
sixth-graders paused by the door of 
the media center, surveying the 
empty hall and the doors which on 
either side opened on offices, 
lounges and classrooms. As the pair 
walked quietly across the lobby, 
several teachers and aides exiting 
the office passed them going in the 
opposite direction. Engaged in dis­
cussion, the teachers did not spare 
the students a glance. As the stu­
dents proceeded down toward the 
boys' room, the principal stepped 
out of the lounge and said hello. 
Returning her greeting, the pair 
made their turnaround. Other, 
younger students began to line up 
to go out to play. Walking slowly 
back to the media center, the pair 
encountered three eighth-graders 
on their way across the lobby. 
Heads together, arms full of books, 
the older students rushed past un­
aware of anything but their gossip 
and giggles. The sixth-grade pair 
stepped into the media center; ex­
cept for the principal's greeting, 
it was as if no one had noticed 
their presence in the hall. It was 
as if they had never been there at 
all. 
lobby and back into the media 
center. They had not been 
caught! 
Each student in the class participated in both scenarios. Those who 
were seen by others during Scenario I reported that they were stared at, 
asked "what are you doing?", even apprehended by zealous or inquisitive 
teachers. By contrast, participation in Scenario II elicited not one 
curious comment from others on the hall. Students decided that there 
are ordinary and not-ordinary ways of accomplishing the same goal. In 
this exercise, the goal was simply to reach the alcove of the boys' room 
and return to the media center. By creating not-ordinary ways to do 
that, students violated the expectations of those they met, sharpened 
others' perceptions, and whetted their curiosities. It was a fact that 
some observers even became suspicious and sought out the teacher of the 
exercise to inquire as to her sanity. During Scenario II, an ordinary 
means of attaining a goal, no resistance was encountered from others on 
the hall. It almost seemed at times that no one noticed the hall wan­
derers at all. 
Students express a number of ideas after such an exercise. One 
evinced his belief that if one is different—that is, engaged in activi­
ties not considered normal for that place and time, or appearing to be 
doing a normal thing in a strange or unfamiliar way--one is destined to 
be singled out, perhaps even in trouble. Another idea which several stu­
dents shared was that it was possible to change others' reactions to 
creative behavior, but that it was not always possible to predict how 
they would react. 
The interrelationship between perception and creativity has been 
studied by a few psychologists and educators. Among them, G. Stanley 
Hall emphasized the role of perception in training the child's 
character;2*5 Sigmund Freud believed that creative behavior was a thera­
peutic aid in resolving childhood conflicts dealing with love and re-
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jection. John Dewey asserted that childhood creativity should be en-
couraged because the resulting broadening of perception helped the child 
1) come to terms with the environment, 2) attain a sense of equilibrium, 
and 3) behave intelligently by solving problems based on experience. 
Viktor Lowenfeld, an art educator of the Progressive Era, crystallized 
Dewey's ideas into a model for child development through art education.^ 
Using traditional art media, he worked with very young students to create 
a sequential skills program which taught the fundamentals of drawing as 
well as the steps in problem solving which Dewey advocated. James Mur-
sell, in music education, working at about the same time, used Dewey's 
problem-solving model in a limited way to teach creativity with the 
materials of music. Mursell's methods stressed ear training, honing 
aural perceptions of relationships among pitches in a musical composi­
tion.*^ 
2®Stanley G. Hall, Aspects of Child Life and Education (New York: 
Appleton and Co., 1921). 
29 
Morris Weitz, "Art--Who Needs It?" Journal of Aesthetic Education 
10 (Spring 1976): 20-27. 
3®John Dewey, Art and Education (Merion, Pennsylvania: The Barnes 
Foundation Press, 1929). 
31 
Viktor Lowenfeld and W. Lambert Brittain, Creative and Mental 
Growth (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1964). 
32James Mursell, Principles of Music Education (New York: Macmillan 
and Co., 1927). 
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The development of perception as a fundamental condition of the 
aesthetic experience dates back to G. W. F. Hegel in the early 1800's. 
T. M. Knox, in his introduction to Hegel's Aesthetics, points out a 
metaphor of which Hegel was particularly fond: 
The eye does not see itself except through its reflection in a 
mirror. Consciousness becomes aware of itself by being aware 
of objects and then by being reflected back into itself from 
them. 3 
As the student progresses in an aesthetic education, his perception guides 
him to new understandings of what is self, and what is not self. Tech­
nique, then, becomes the way the student reconciles tools, instruments, 
media, or learned actions (Not-self) with his feelings, emotions, and de­
sires (Geist or Self). This dialectical view of art is a pervasive arche­
type which has influenced many writers and researchers in the various 
artistic disciplines. Some educators have recently attempted to break 
away from traditional views of perception and art. Kenneth Beittel of­
fers a contrast to the sequential training of perception in favor of a 
holistic, affective approach. In his view, learning is more than a set 
of skills to be copied, more than just educating a student to perceive 
in a progressively more sophisticated manner. Learning, says Beittel, 
is potential for action which is "teased out" through being and becoming, 
encounter and dialogue. It is a process where the student recognizes 
that all he has is "Self," and that the act of creation is more important 
than the evaluation of what is produced. While studying with a master 
craftsman in Japan, Beittel learned the Japanese symbol for metaphor 
means "speaking in darkness." His comment on sequential•skills is 
Everything must be learned at once because nothing can be 
T. M. Knox, Introduction to Hegel's Aesthetics, p. x. 
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learned at all. One cannot learn to speak in darkness by 
speaking in the light. The child and the novice are pro­
tected by their ignorance. The "everything" they must face 
in their own proper darkness is commensurate with the scope 
of their heart and mind. It is even so with the greatest 
genius . . . the work of the child and of the genius can 
both address us as art speaking.34 
Still, other educators cling to the dialectic between material and 
self: 
How does one learn to draw, paint or sculpt? 
1. Skill in the management of material, 
2. Skill in perceiving qualitative relationships among those 
forms in the work itself, in the environment, and in 
mental images, 
3. Skill in inventing forms that satisfy the producer within 
the limits of the materials he works, 
4. Skill in producing spatial order, aesthetic order, and 
expressive power. 
Rudolf Arnheim supports the idea that artistic creativity is "going from 
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whole to particular by a process of perceptual differentiation." What 
is implied by traditional views and eschewed by artist-teachers like 
Beittel is that the artist must have a fair idea of where his technique 
leads him, and what the resulting product will be, before and during the 
actual creative process. The education of perception, then, in tradition­
al aesthetic education, is to render more predictable the outcomes of the 
creative process and to give the artist finer control of the media and 
technique used in producing an art object. But to Eisner, "the joy of 
34 
Kenneth Beittel, "Perceptions of the Artist about the Affective 
Domain" in Feeling, Valuing, and the Art of Growing, eds. Louise M. Ber-
Ttian and Jessie A. Roderick (Washington, D. C.: Association for Super­
vision and Curriculum Development, 1977), pp. 114-115. 
7C 
JJEl.liot W. Eisner and David W. Ecker, eds., Readings in Art 
Education-(Waltham, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1966), p. 46. 
•^Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the 
Creative Eye (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1954). 
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the ride, even more than the arrival, is the motive force behind the 
artist's work."*^ To Beittel, "the artist chooses to act in fullness of 
being, in the midst of absurdity and nothingness." Thus the above 
represent the newer view of aesthetic education which infers unity from 
the dialectic; it emphasizes process rather than product. 
There is a good reason for the present dissatisfaction with product-
oriented aesthetic education. Teachers and parents tend to confuse the 
artistic products and actions of their children with the artistic en­
deavors of professionals. In the rush to encourage our students to de­
velop more sophisticated skill in handling media, the creative process is 
often overlooked. For example, a ten-year-old boy was richly rewarded 
with praise for a poem he brought home, but castigated for sitting in the 
closet with the lights off to "watch the pictures on my eyelids." Clearly, 
a creative process which does not result in a product is not as highly 
valued as that process which does. Similarly, as illustrated by Scenarios 
I and II, parents and teachers tend to respond positively to behaviors 
which conform to aesthetic norms or expectations, and respond ambiguously 
to childhood behaviors which do not seem to fit into traditional aesthetic 
patterns. 
The hedonist view of the aesthetic experience focuses less upon the 
formal comparative aspects of art and more upon the pleasurable and ec­
static. Hedonist aesthetics predate external aesthetics, having an early 
link with the search for and creation of beauty. Plato, in the Greater 
Hippias, commented upon the beauty and pleasure in living life to be 
37 
Eisner, The Educational Imagination, p. x. 
^Beittel, "perceptions," p. 113. 
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rich, healthy, honored by the greeks, to reach an old age, 
and, after burying his parents nobly, himself to be borne 
to the tomb with solemn ceremony by his own sons.39 
Hedonism and the good life have been intertwined in literature ever 
since the time of Plato. The usual connotation, however, inferred from 
the word hedonist, brings to mind a profligate individual engaged in 
constant revelry, squandering money and energy in the search for ever 
more intense earthly pleasures. This description is more that of a 
sybarite. In this discussion, hedonism is used to refer to the transient 
pleasures which accompany the artistic object or creative experience. 
Hedonistic vicissitudes may range from mild sensations of comfort, Tight­
ness, and well-being to ecstasies, visions, and hallucinations. 
Writers who have expressed hedonist philosophy include St. Thomas 
Aquinas, St. Augustine of Hippo, and David Hume. Aquinas viewed art 
and music as aids in the production of good acts, from which pleasurable 
sensations result.^ Augustine postulated an "ordo amoris" in which 
scheme each object or act is accorded the kind and degree of love which 
it merits, and pleasure is derived from each in accordance with its place 
in the order.^ Hume also offered a hedonist viewpoint as to the 
rationale for man's actions toward other men, and of the love for God.^ 
7Q 
Plato, in K. Aschenbrenner and A. Isenberg, Aesthetic Theories: 
Studies in the Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall and Co., 1964), p. 203. 
^Thomas Gilby, Poetic Experience: An Introduction to Thomist 
Aesthetic (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967). 
41c. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947). 
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David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 2nd ed. 
(La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1966). 
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Perhaps the best explication of hedonist logic was formulated by Jeremy 
Benthara in the Hedonistic Calculus. The pleasures men seek, he wrote, 
are mitigated by 
1. The intensity of the pleasures, 
2. Their duration, 
3. Their degree of probability, 
4. The promptitude of their fullness, 
5. Their fecundity (the tendency of pleasure to be followed by 
pain), 
6. Their purity (freedom from pain), 
7. Their social extent (others who are affected by them).43 
Any aesthetic event or object could be considered in the light of 
this framework. An experience which maximized items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 
and minimized items 5 and 7 might be said to be exquisitely hedonistic. 
Experiences which included the likelihood of item 5 might be approached 
with caution; experiences which involve other persons willingly would 
have to be examined in contrast to activities which involved other per­
sons unwillingly. 
Tolstoy believed that art effects a brotherhood of men, since its 
purpose is to share feelings. The pleasure felt in sharing these feel­
ings and emotions--some bitter, some sweet—worked toward a true union of 
mankind on Earth. However, Tolstoy pointed out, most art forsakes this 
ideal in order to promote emotions and ideas serving an effete class (Art 
in the service of Taste).Schiller also decried Taste, which to him 
was the essence of the external (comparative) system of aesthetics. 
Taste, they argued, divides rather than unifies Mankind; it is a 
^^Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, ed. Philip Wheelwright (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
Doran, and Co., 1935). 
^Tolstoy, What is Art. 
political phenomenon which tends to lessen the sensuous pleasure of 
art.45 
In the twentieth century, several writers have escaped from formal 
aesthetic systems to comment upon art and beauty from a hedonist stand­
point. Standing outside the strong critical tradition is George 
Santayana. His philosophy of art promoted the idea that beauty is 
pleasure objectified; in other words, our pleasure is viewed as a quality 
of the object or event, which then appears to us as beautiful. Santayana 
believed that we come to know beauty from within ourselves, rather than 
appealing to an external set of rules about art.46 William James, as 
well, saw personal experience as the structural basis of metaphysical and 
aesthetic reality; 
as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, 
we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.4'7 
Alan Watts and George Leonard both derived hedonistic ideas about 
education from Eastern philosophies. Watts wrote that Godhead is iden­
tified with truth (sat), consciousness (chit), and bliss (ananda). Full 
manifestation of these three attributes results in an experience or state 
of moksha--liberation. By nurturing this attribute of ananda, and by at­
tending to the processes of sat and chit, one may see the world 
become real, in the moment it is no longer clutched, in the 
moment that its changeful fluidity is no longer resisted . . . 
45Freidrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
trans, with introd. by Reginald D. Snell. (New York: Frederick Ungar, 
1965) . 
46George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outline- of 
Aesthetic Theory (New York: C. Scribner's, 1898). 
4-^William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study 
in Human Nature (New York: "Modern Library, 1936}. 
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to the mind which lets go and moves with the flow of change 
. . . like a ball in a stream the sense of emptiness or 
transience becomes a kind of ecstasy.4^ 
Leonard also uses the concept of ananda in writing about the "Dionysian 
factor" in education.49 He posits that liberational ecstasy can be 
reached through meditation (personal learning), through the natural en­
vironment (person and nature), and through developing values in human 
relationships (person to person).^® 
Hedonism, the process of joy, ananda, ecstasy: whatever one terms 
it, it threatens things as they are. It promises that there is more to 
life than knowledge customarily delivers. Since pleasure is so easily 
identified with the arts, it may be one reason why administrators and 
other educators sometimes appear to have a fear of musicians, actors, 
artists, and dancers as teachers in the classroom. Yet, 
1. Ecstasy is not necessarily opposed to reason, 
2. Ecstasy is not necessarily opposed to order, 
3. Ecstasy is neither moral or immoral of itself, 
4. Ecstasy is man's most powerful ally against anomie.^l 
The hedonist component of aesthetic education has been recognized by 
such groups as the Educational Policies Commission of the National Educa­
tion Association. They wrote, 
the fine arts can more easily be taught in a playful manner . . . 
creativity research continually shows a relationship between 
playfulness and creative behavior.^2 
4̂ Alan Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Random House, 1957). 
^George Leonard, Education and Ecstasy (New York: Delacorte Press, 
1968). 
^®Ibid., p. 63. 
^Ibid., p.. 65. 
^The National Education Association, Report on Education and the 
Fine Arts of the Educational Policies Commission (Washington, D. C.: 
1968), p. 4. 
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Furthermore, hedonist values are present in traditional schemes of 
aesthetic education, although they work behind the scenes. For example, 
to assume, as does Harry Broudy, that learning to create, analyze and 
classify aesthetic objects or events will intensify the pleasure of the 
aesthetic experience is to acknowledge the hedonist heritage.Similar­
ly, to assume that these more intense aesthetic experiences are heuristic, 
that is, that they will affect subsequent choices in the arts, is to 
borrow liberally from Bentham and his Calculus. 
Hedonism has also found a home in the psychological foundations of 
education. Concepts presented by Maslow, such as "motivation" and "self-
actualization" are based on the person's ability to reward himself for 
actions he perceives as "good and true."^ There is also a hedonistic 
orientation to Maslow1s theories about peak experiences—the intense 
feelings which accompany activities involving all a person's faculties 
and capabilities.^ Finally, Maslow admonishes us to "re-sacralize" the 
person: to find pleasure in considering another "under the aspect of 
r £ 
eternity," as Spinoza would have it. To do the opposite, to take 
pleasure in acts or objects not acceptable to society or which stand out­
side even the broadest definition of harmless evils, represents not only 
aesthetic but moral dysfunction as well.-''7 
5%arry Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing: An Essay on Aesthetic 
Education (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1972). 
^A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1970). 
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Idem., The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: Viking 
Press, 1971). p. 45. 
^Ibid., p. 50. 
^Joseph Margolis, "Moral and Aesthetic Judgment: Against Compart­
ment aliz at ion," Journal of Aesthetics 25 (August 1965): 35-50. 
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The Creation of Settings: Its Aesthetic Dimension 
In Chapter Six of The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies, 
Seymour Sarason describes the resources and discusses the values of the 
professionals involved in starting the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic. 
The reasons for starting the . . . clinic were no less varied and 
complex than any other instance of motivation and action, but 
several things were quite clear and they are contained in the 
following propositions. (1) The mental health professions were 
oriented primarily to dealing with individuals who presented them­
selves (or in the case of children were presented by others) as 
having personal problems. (2) These problems were conceptualized 
in ways that required "treatment" by highly trained specialists. 
(3) The disparity between the number rendering service was of a 
magnitude that was unresolvable. (4) Those who obtained service 
were almost exclusively white and middle class, and they repre­
sented a small fraction of white, middle class people who wanted 
the service. (5) The most notable exception to this was our 
public "mental hospitals," where treatment as an individual human 
being was notable by its absence. 
Sarason comments that the situation represented by these five prop­
ositions was "bad, sad, and wrong," but he also reflects that the dis­
parity between supply and demand for psychological services and responses 
which inadequately address this disparity are inevitable and not likely 
to change. 
« 
The problem continued to be defined in a way that required 
dependence on certain kinds of human resources which . . . 
could only increase the disparity between the numbers ren­
dering and needing service.^9 
The choices facing Sarason and his colleagues in establishing their clinic 
are familiar ones to the classroom teacher. Knowing that any attempt to 
open a free counseling clinic would result in the same type of disparity, 
^Seymour B. Sarason, The Creation of Settings and the Future 
Societies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972), pp. 115-116. 
59Ibid., p. 116. 
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they felt the problem must be reconceptualized. The colleagues could 1) 
redefine "mental illness" or "drug problem" so as to reduce the number of 
clients for which the psychologists could justify treatment, 2) go beyond 
human resources to drug therapy or computer counseling techniques, 3) 
hire or solicit help and untrained volunteers to assist with the caseload 
or 4) spend each day coping with large numbers of clients until frustra­
tion and exhaustion made their efforts useless. Sarason and his associ­
ates chose six stipulations from their examination of the problem. To 
paraphrase, 
1) The clinic would define its task in terms of service to the 
individuals working in it, 
2) The clinic would accept therapists who expressed radically 
different ways of thinking about service, 
3) The clinic would concentrate on settings, not individuals, 
particularly settings involving children, 
4) Faced with the problem of choosing to work with the existing 
setting or creating a new one, the clinic would choose the 
latter, 
5) The clinic would employ people who seemed to have the talent 
which could be developed to a productive level of service, 
regardless of credentials, 
6) Each member of the clinic would be doing what every other 
member was doing.60 
Sarason and his associates in the Yale setting made a series of difficult 
choices. Their first decision was to acknowledge the perceived lack of 
satisfaction for both counselor and client in many traditional settings. 
This lack of satisfaction is due to the necessarily perfunctory nature of 
relationships in counseling. Interaction between client and counselor is 
often of low intensity although it extends over a long period of time. 
This is usually the result of limited time, resources, and energy on the 
• part of the counselor. The heavier the caseload, the more limited he 
^Sarason, Creation of Settings, p. 114. 
becomes. Dilution of service is a corollary phenomenon and sometimes re­
sults in high anxiety. Asserting that help to as many patients as possi­
ble was not a primary goal of the Yale setting, Sarason substituted a 
more acceptable goal of personal satisfaction for the counselors. This 
reconceptualization is consistent with the theory of primary settings of 
goals (a sense of self-worth and a psychological sense of community) and 
with reconceptual aesthetic theory as well, because it emphasizes process, 
not necessarily product. 
Rather than create a traditional clinic where frustrations mount due 
to staff anxieties, Sarason and his associates chose to create meaning 
and pleasure for themselves; in this mode of action, they could at least 
control some aspects of professional development and personal satisfac­
tion. Consistent with the hedonistic component of aesthetic theory, 
we were going to judge ourselves only secondarily by how helpful 
we were to others. Conceivably we would not be very helpful, 
and conceivably we might even be harmful and yet be successful 
in terms of our personal learning and growth.61 
If such a choice seems morally ill-considered, view the alternative 
through this analogy of a teacher in a classroom. Faced with the realiza­
tion that she, too, has only limited time, energy, and resources, the 
teacher must choose between "dilution of service" and service to herself. 
If the teacher decides to accept the alternative of "dilution of service" 
she may find her persona rarefied among thirty or more students. Soon 
the notion arrives that for some students, she will do some good, for a 
few she will do some greater good, but for some, no good at all will come. 
With this perception arrives feelings of anxiety, fatigue, and helpless­
ness which researchers have referred to as "burn-out." To use Maslow's 
ft 1 
Sarason> Creation of Settings, p. 116. 
term, the teacher (and by analogy, the counselor in Sarason's original 
setting) is working with a sense of deficiency-cognition.*^ The teacher 
may view children as detached from their settings, separate from their 
history and culture. The teacher may, most unfortunately, see her stu­
dents as belonging to someone or something else, not to a setting of 
their joint creation. This separation of elements from the organic whole 
is not consistent with any aesthetic theory (see Chapter One, "The 
Aesthetic Dimension in Education"). Contrast the outlook of a teacher 
with a being-cognition orientation. Her duty is not merely to nurture 
the students as if they were greenhouse plants, or to guide their foot-
A3 
steps along life's perilous journey. Rather, it is to regard each 
student as he is, not as he was or can be. The student in this sense is 
less a creation of the teacher than of the setting itself. The teacher's 
artistry must be directed to the setting as a whole, not to the maniupla-
tion of the individual elements. The teacher's artistry must also be 
directed inwards, toward herself, to enable herself to grow so that the 
students may share that growth. The process of teaching evolves through 
the teacher's ability to come to terms with the reality that she does not 
possess the time, energy, or resources to be all things to all students; 
rather, it is she herself who should strive for a sense of informed per­
sonal worth and dignity, and to seek aesthetic satisfaction in the crea­
tion of the classroom setting. According to Maslow, this state should be 
as a result of an evolutionary process of thought, not a posture of 
^Maslow, Farther Reaches, p. 123. 
^Herbert Kliebard, "Metaphorical Roots of Curriculum Design" in 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, 
California: McCutchan, 1975). 
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philosophical reductionist (reducing the situation to its most elemental 
attitudes and adopting the one which is the course of least resistance).^ 
It is quite a different thing to arrive at the goals of self-worth and 
sense of community after long experience with other alternatives than it 
is to simply accept what may appear to be self-seeking motives with no 
awareness of their consequences to others. 
Another analogical relationship concerning Sarason's conclusion #1 
is that of the creative artist—the composer, playwright, or painter who 
works with the raw materials of the arts. Most persons who paint, write, 
or compose are aware of the tremendous array of technical resources 
available to them yet are constrained by reality to choose only a few of 
them. They develop a style of writing, painting, or composition which is 
identifiable as their own. It is a fact that one artist working within 
his or her personal style cannot convey a message with meaning for the 
entire human population of the planet, nor does he intend to. Style in 
art is the result of the acceptance or rejection of certain resources, 
the use of time and energy in developing technical mastery of these re­
sources. Style is a way of conveying meaning (the artist's "service"), 
but it is also ultimately the result of the artist's satisfaction with 
(sense of personal worth) the choices he or she has made in regards to 
the shepherding of the resources available. In much the same way as 
Sarason and his colleagues decided to "explore new ways of thinking and 
acting" and in much the same way that a teacher evolves a style of ped­
agogy and the matching curricular tools, so the artist engages in the 
quest for personal style. 
^Maslow, Farther Reaches, p. 252. 
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Personal style based on an aesthetic scheme also figures in Erikson's 
commentary on social intercourse, Toys and Reasons. 
Mutual interplay ... is governed by the eagerness and capacity 
of persons to enhance each other's leeway in affiliative and 
erotic ways. But as each expands in his readiness, he persist­
ently experiences the boundaries where reciprocal antagonisms 
set one person against another and one group against another. 
The model for the creation of settings provides amelioration for these 
reciprocal antagonisms by recognizing the need for establishing and re­
newing covenants of behavior.^ In the aesthetic dimension of the set­
tings model, those covenants which serve to maximize duration and inten­
sity are potentially more capable of fostering the conditions which 
Erkison describes as indispensable to favorable social intercourse; trust, 
autonomy, and initiative.^ This is what Sarason and his associates were 
attempting in the Yale clinic: the artist, similarly, tries to make his 
message last longer and become more intense through the art object. 
Besides consideration of style (a function of personal satisfaction), 
an aesthetic analysis of the creation of settings model must also attend 
to its form, relationships among its elements, regional qualities (see 
item c in Beardsley's model of aesthetic experience, essay I, Chapter 2), 
its unity, and its existence as a separate portion of the phenomenal 
field. 
The creation of settings model satisfies the aesthetic requirement 
of separateness while retaining a flexible relationship among its elements, 
6^Erik H. Erikson, Toys and Reasons: Stages in the Ritualization of 
Experience (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977), pp. 69-70. 
^Dale L. Brubaker, Creative Leadership in Elementary Schools 
(Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, 1976). 
^^Erik H. Erikson, "The Eight Ages of Man" in The Challenge of 
Youth, ed. Erik H. Erikson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Co., 1963). 
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capable of various critical interpretations (See Chapter 1 "Models and 
Design"). The asymmetry of the shape Brubaker suggests connotes a pas­
sive, non-linear approach to the consideration of goals and processes. 
As the metaphorical "amoeba" changes shape in response to environmental 
contingencies, so too the shape of the model shows not a finished, con­
crete product, but rather a project whose direction and constitution 
varies at the desire of its creators. The creation of settings model 
resembles not a finished work of art, but the process of its coming to 
be. The three categories within the model—assumptions, processes, and 
goals—have an analogical relationship to a time scheme of the artistic-
aesthetic process. The artist's reflection, application of technique, 
and creative object (work of art) all combine to produce a more or less 
ambiguous model whose meaning will be different for each perceiver. 
Sarason's conclusion #4 supports the view of the setting as a total 
creative activity rather than as a finished product. In much the same 
way as a musical work differs from a painting, so does the process of 
creating a setting contrast with institutionalized views of group efforts. 
No one ever asked Van Gogh to paint "A Starry Night" again, yet musicians 
are continually re-creating serious and popular works of musical art. 
The difference is between the concrete and the temporal aspects of art. 
The creation of settings belongs to the category of temporal endeavors--
for proof, consider conclusion #4. 
Which regional or emotional qualities should the creation of settings 
model suggest? Although the qualities of beauty and elegance have been 
connected with theories and proofs, the process-oriented nature of the 
model brings to mind the qualities of grace and wit. Dancers, engaging 
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in their temporal form of art, exhibit gracefulness—so must settings 
members constantly remember that the symmetry of human relationships is 
at best fleeting, a fluid sort of design which changes, stabilizes, and 
then changes again. Wit implies repartee—settings members are encouraged 
to keep in mind the network of ongoing communication which is the life of 
the setting. Grace connotes an easier, more approachable understanding 
of form than either beauty or elegance, which are somewhat overwhelming 
in human contexts. Wit brings to mind a more affable, intelligent 
pleasure than frivolity. Both form and pleasure, essential aesthetic 
concepts, should pervade creation of settings processes. Playfulness 
with language—the pleasurable shaping and re-shaping of forms— 
characterizes settings members experience with communications. Humans 
who choose to create settings do so bravely, like Camus—with a concern 
for refusals and recreations, for a reconstruction of the world.^ Re­
fusals, because they will not submit, as Sarason and colleagues did not 
submit, to thinking and acting in the same old ways—recreations, because 
as Huizinga points out, to create and to play are inextricably woven into 
69 the experience of man. 
^Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, trans. Justin 
O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).. 
^^Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in 
Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955). 
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CHAPTER III 
A NEW MODEL FOR AESTHETIC EDUCATION 
The Aesthetic and the Developmental 
Those wishing to validate study and use of aesthetic theories and 
models in school settings must apply themselves to the task of reconcil­
ing an essentially unlearned, unique-to-the-individual, unpredictable and 
largely unmanageable form of human experience with the systematic, objec­
tive developmental framework that curriculum attempts to present. This 
reconciliation is often difficult, regardless of the hypothesis that an 
experiential curriculum and the aesthetic experience are the flesh and 
bone of the educational body. There is simply too little known about the 
nature of the aesthetic experience--as a result of this lack, teachers 
have little expertise at engendering aesthetic experiences in the class­
room. 
While criticism of curriculum has successfully made inroads into the 
traditional fortresses of hard research, the accompanying techniques of 
managing and critiquing aesthetic events in the classroom have not become 
popular fare in graduate institutions. This can only be laid to the fact 
that schools and departments of fine arts view their stock in trade as 
technical, reproducible knowledge about the particular disciplines—their 
students know how to produce plays, conduct orchestras, and choreograph 
dance pieces. Yet the larger concerns of post-creative reflection—the 
enjoyment and savoring of the aesthetic event—remain mired in complex 
formal, critical treatises. Teachers are taught how to but not of what. 
It is the of what--the aesthetic experience—that justifies art, that 
causes the rhapsody within the breast to supplant the notes in the air. 
The notion that aesthetics possesses a developmental dimension is 
rather recent. By developmental is meant that the pleasure in coming to 
know form is a process which unfolds and improves through the lifetime of 
the individual. The idea that the aesthetic experience can be intensi­
fied by training or education is central to the concept of a development­
al aesthetic. A brief review of five aesthetic theories yields an inter­
esting insight. These individual explications of aesthetic theory—by 
Plato, Schiller, Read, Dewey and Langer—stand in chronological relation 
to each other and also have an analogical connection to the stages of in­
tellectual development of Jean Piaget. That these writings constitute a 
model which so serendipitously applies to the concept of the development­
al aesthetic is a coincidence which seems to lend credence to the exist­
ence and operation of archetypal influences upon current and historical 
theorizing. 
How young children and adolescents develop capacities for aesthetic 
experiences, and the character of those experiences at different stages 
of intellectual development, is the basis of the remainder of this por­
tion of the chapter. 
What Piaget has asserted in his developmental model of cognitive 
learning is that the child gradually moves from an unawareness of the 
separation of self and environment to a stage where it realizes that ob­
jects and forces outside the self are capable of being manipulated and 
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later conceptualized. These stages of development are called the 
sensori-motor, the concrete, and the abstract. 
^Brian Rotman, Jean Piaget: Psychologist of the Real (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1978). 
Robert Panzarella has offered an index to four different types of 
aesthetic experiences.His work is based upon observation and also 
upon the verbal reports of such experiences by the persons being ob­
served. His types fall into four broad categories: renewal, motor-
sensory, withdrawal, and fusion-emotional experiences or "ecstasies." 
An aesthetic experience which is centered around a renewal vision or 
ecstasy is one in which a new view of the world is formed. After this 
aesthetic renewal, the world seems better, more beautiful than before. 
It still contains the tragic and the flawed, but this does not alter its 
goodness. The motivational aspects of renewal experiences consist of 
impulses to produce music, dance, or dramatic or visual art. Laski 
hypothesized that the impulse to be creative is inherently antithetical 
to the continuation of the ecstatic or aesthetic state and terminates it 
72 in order to initiate creative manipulation, testing, and probing. 
Motor-sensory experiences consist of physical responses and such 
phenomena as feeling high or floating. Body rhythms and changes in pos­
ture and locomotion also accompany motor-sensory ecstasies. Panzarella 
observed that these types of ecstasies are negatively related to trans­
formational ecstasies (fusion-emotional or renewal). He posits that 
motor-sensory aesthetic experiences do not change the perceptions of the 
self because the self has taken a more active role in producing movement 
responses--the tendency of the physical reactions to be localized in dis­
tinct parts of the organism (arms, legs, hips, trunk) from which the 
^•'•Robert Panzarella, "The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Peak Experi­
ences," Journal of Humanistic Psychology 20 (Winter 1980): 69-85* 
^Marghanita Laski, Ecstasy: A Study of Some Secular and Religious 
Experiences (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961). 
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mental self remains somewhat detached. Music begets such aesthetic ex­
periences, as do sports and oratory. 
Withdrawal ecstasies involve loss of contact with the physical and 
social environment. A perceptual narrowing occurs; attention is riveted 
to the aesthetic event. Visual arts, drama, and dance as well as film 
and natural phenomena induce withdrawal experiences. Often the person 
feels a loss of contact with others, and a sense of loss when the 
aesthetic event is finished. 
Fusion-emotional ecstasies are rated highest in Panzarella's study 
in terms of desirability. The experience is one of total merger with the 
art object. Often such ecstasies result in personality transformation, 
especially if the art object has been considered as having a moral or 
ethical dimension. 
Humane texts mean nothing unless they are read seriously--that 
is to say, for moral instruction . . . with the deepest impulse 
to learn something about life and to acquire wisdom.^ 
Fusion-emotional aesthetic experiences are nearly always limited to ob­
servers of art. Performers are trained to retain cognitive control over 
their art. As Gordon Craig has so succinctly stated, "emotion conspires 
75 
against art" so performers are on guard against emotional involvement 
which might mean loss of technical control. 
Let us now examine the five aesthetic theories mentioned above and 
arrive at a schematic model which shows the relationships between the 
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Panzarella, "Phenomenology," p. 73. 
^William Albert Levi, "Uses of the Humanities in Personal Life," 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 10 (Fall 1976): 6. 
^Edward Gordon Craig, On the Art of the Theatre (London: W. 
Heinemann, 1912). 
60 
Piagetian stages of development, the four types of aesthetic experience 
postulated by Panzarella, and the five theories themselves. 
For Plato, art had no use in the Utopian republic he designed. 
Morris Weitz, commenting on Plato's lack of sympathy for the arts and 
for artists, paraphrases from the Republic, 
It (art) is not only not good, but . . . downright harmful in 
the manner in which it sponsors fiction and falsehood, and 
engenders feelings and emotions which endanger morals and the 
rational life altogether.^6 
Curiously enough, Plato's views are an important first step in 
fashioning a developmental model of aesthetic growth. Despite his lack 
of enthusiasm about the place of the arts in education, Plato's theory of 
mimesis was the model for art works through the Greek golden age, and 
during the Renaissance as well. Art, to Plato, was twice removed from 
the Ideal: not an imitation of the good, true, and just, but an imita­
tion of an imitation. This concept of mimesis forms the earliest 
aesthetic theory, and remains in powerful control of our production of 
art, even to this day. Sanctions like "art imitates life" and "modeling 
behavior" are derived from mimetic theory. Rote learning, memorization 
of facts, and recitation also have their genesis in mimetic theory; "good" 
knowledge is that which is founded upon authority, which one encounters in 
books in libraries, and from the lips of a certified, qualified teacher. 
Much of learning during early infancy is mimetic; the infant during the 
sensori-motor phase of cognitive development responds to a mother's smile 
by a first attempt to copy it. Infants learn to attend to objects by 
following movement with their eyes and head; babies' first sounds are 
7%eitz, "Art—Who Needs It?" p. 24. 
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copies of what they hear around them. Nature, children, and adults serve 
as models for infants1 actions. Self-awareness has little significance 
at this primary stage of aesthetic development. The infant does not dif­
ferentiate art works from other objects or events, but may develop a sense 
that art has some importance if the models around him also consider it im­
portant. The mimetic stage of development has been carried over into 
childhood's later years by educational agencies from antiquity to the 
present. The classic view of education is as a transmitter of a cultural 
heritage and prescribed forms of knowledge. The older student's proper 
attitude in this model is one of reverence for the ideal of pre-existing 
knowledge. The educational revolution of the past half-century has 
focused on the fact that while mimetic theory has powerful implications 
for early childhood curricula, its influence is outmoded and inappropriate 
at later stages of development. 
For Friedrich Schiller, an aesthetic education 
affords the development of the play impulse which ultimately 
unifies conflicting sensuous and formal impulses—a harmoniza­
tion that was a necessary prelude ... to the synthesis of „ 
conflicting beliefs in the larger social and cultural crisis. 
Schiller's contribution to aesthetic theory was typified by the idea that 
the aesthetic state was a middle ground between sensuous behavior and 
logical thought. A corollary argument of his was that Man must pass 
through the aesthetic state in order to reach the higher ground of moral 
and ethical reasoning. He postulated three stages in Man's progression 
from natural instincts to logical reasoning: first, harmonious Nature 
(as in the late sensori-motor stage when the child begins to recognize 
7?Walter -Grossman, "Schiller's Aesthetic Education" Journal of 
Aesthetic Education 2 (January 1968): 34-41. 
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the subject-object paradigm), the antagonism of forces and the disinte­
gration of personality (mature Man before an aesthetic experience), and 
the third, the state of renewal or integration which proceeds from the 
aesthetic experience and which precedes the perfection of the individual 
and the society in which he lives.78 
The developmental significance of Schiller's theories lies in the 
importance he attached to the play impulse. If, at an early age, the 
child imitates behavior, then at the next stage, he must initiate playful 
behavior, to create actions of his own which may or may not result in 
created objects. In the larger model which is being fashioned here, the 
child is still progressing through the sensori-motor stage of cognitive 
development. Creative behavior is characteristically associated with 
pleasure, and is not always directed to the production of an object or 
form. Such play is a stepping-stone from the sensori-motor to the con­
crete cognitive stage. 
Sir Herbert Read, writing during the Industrial Revolution, pop­
ularized the slogan "education through art". His discourses were drawn 
from a number of sources, including psychoanalysis, psychology, art his­
tory, and anthropology. They almost always reveal their origins in a 
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definition,of art as the discovery of form. Read's theory of form cor­
responds with concepts about the concrete stage of cognitive development. 
It is in the early years of primary school that the child begins to en­
counter art, music, drama, and dance as "subjects;" he perceives not only 
78Schiller; Letters. 
^Michael J. Parsons, "Herbert Read on Education," Journal of 
Aesthetic Education 5 (October 1969): 27-45. 
the discrete forms of each, but the separation of the arts from other 
school endeavors. Motor-sensory and withdrawal types of aesthetic ex­
periences are characteristic of this age. The child is keenly aware of 
art as separate from other forms of experiences, but usually only because 
he is told so. Later he recognizes that some forms of art make him "feel 
good" or "feel sad." He cannot explain why a certain piece of music or a 
painting makes him feel just so, and the same painting or music may not 
make him feel the same way again. The recognition of the aesthetic ex­
perience as linked to art is just beginning to dawn in his experience. 
Repeated forms and symmetry are apparent to the child at this point: 
rhythms in music and dance, repetition of designs in art and sculpture 
have a particular appeal. The emotional content of art also grows in his 
awareness. The separation of fantasy from reality is accomplished by 
most children at this stage, and lends a special poignancy to dramatic 
and literary experiences. The categorization and manipulation of con­
crete forms is the hallmark of this stage. Creation and manipulation of 
ideas behind the forms will not come for several years. 
Dewey called aesthetic experience 
experience in its integrity . . . experience freed from the 
forces that impede and confuse its development as experience.^ 
The effecting of connections, the achieving of continuities which 
aesthetic experiences foster are integral parts of the Deweyan theories 
of growth through reinterpretation of experience. Art requires of the 
child, during the pre-abstract stage of cognitive development, to bridge . 
cognitive gaps and to complete or accept artistic ambiguities. During 
^Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 113. 
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the pre-abstract stage, the child is learning to manipulate the raw stuff 
of the arts. Although not yet ready to come to terms with the emotionally 
symbolic content of the arts, he still may be intrigued by the possibili­
ties for self-expression which the arts offer. The perceptions are 
sharpened as the student learns to attend to the separate elements within 
the art object. The aesthetic experience is of particular significance 
at this stage of cognitive development. As Pauli framed the question, 
What is the nature of the bridge between the sense perceptions 
and the concepts? All logical thinkers have arrived at the 
conclusion that pure logic is fundamentally incapable of con­
structing such a link.8* 
The aesthetic experience may be capable of creating such a link. Rela­
tions of qualities within art forms, and the link or connection between 
the senses and concept formation share a paradoxical model. Polanyi 
speaks of "knowing" the face and "not knowing" the separate identity of 
each feature—nose, eyes, ears and mouth, and their proportional relation­
ships. In a similar manner, the child during the pre-abstract stage 
"knows" the art work and engages himself in coming to know the separate 
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elements of the work. To paraphrase Polanyi, the bridge between tacit 
and explicit knowing is like the link between the senses and concept form­
ation. The child is creating that mystical link and is doing so in an 
increasingly more symbolic manner. 
The emergence of the renewal type of aesthetic experience is a hall­
mark of the pre-abstract stage. By early adolescence, the student becomes 
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W. Pauli, The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific 
Theories of Kepler (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955). 
^Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1966). 
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aware of peer pressure and has experienced both frustration and joy in 
his relationships with others. Renewal experiences confirm his hopes 
that all is well in his world. Identification with dramatic roles and 
with the emotional content of the dance, music, and visual arts contri­
bute to his psychological as well as aesthetic growth. Happy endings and 
a satisfactory climax and denouement are acceptable and desirable. The 
absence of plot, as well as music, art, or literature which is non-
representational, will have little referent in his experience. Art which 
confirms his wish for stability provides a starting point for his depart­
ure into the abstract stage of development. 
As the child becomes an adolescent, nearly seventy-five percent of 
his physical and mental development is achieved. Between the ages of 
twelve and fifteen a third of adolescents move into the abstract stage of 
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development. By eighteen nearly two-thirds have done so. Fusion-
emotional aesthetic experiences extend the adolescent's new capacities of 
conceptualization in a more immediate manner than other types of experi­
ences. The ideas of art now speak to the adolescent with new eloquence. 
In the fusion state, the person develops empathy for these ideas. Con­
ceptualization enables him to extend those empathic impulses to other 
persons, and to become aware that they, too, are possessed of emotions 
and feelings. As beholders of art, students in the abstract stage have 
"been endowed for a time with the keen perceptions and impetuous emotions 
of a nobler and more penetrating intelligence."^ Art as a symbolic 
^William D. Rower, Paul R. Ammon and Phebe Cramer, Understanding 
Intellectual Development (New York: Dryden Press, 1974). 
®^Ruskin, Art Criticism, p. 85. 
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means of expression "communicates and records matters with which neither 
or 
science or philosophy can deal." Suzanne Langer began to formulate the 
concept of art as symbol in the late 1940's. With the publication of 
Philosophy in a New Key, she allied her aesthetic theories with Ruskin 
and Tolstoy who wrote that art was a means of communication. If communi­
cation can be universalized by any means, the artistic-symbolic would 
surely be the way, Langer argued.^ The purpose of art is to perpetuate 
communication between artist and audience, between artists and artists, 
and between members of the audience. Artistic-symbolic communication is 
unique because it has two separate dimensions of meaning. We can know 
what a picture represents in its explicit dimension; for example, we 
readily acknowledge that a particular painting is "of a tree," but 
another tacit dimension of meaning—the symbolic—cues our understanding 
of what the picture means. The regional qualities like grace, elegance, 
wit, irony, frivolity and so on are linked to techniques in all the arts. 
If a tree is represented in such-and-such a manner, it may be said to be 
elegant. Other artistic techniques will render meanings of a different 
nature. Nobility, pathos, fear, anxiety, happiness, reverie and tender­
ness are all symbolic functions. During the abstract stage of cognitive 
development, the student comes to know the two dimensions of meaning in 
art. More importantly, he begins to value the universality of symbolic 
art. He is embarking on that journey of a soul among masterpieces that 
85Ibid., p. 89. 
Suzanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the 
Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1942). 
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Krutch sought. He understands that we "teach the meaning of freedom when 
we . . . explore the world of imagination and art."8^ 
By the abstract stage of cognitive development, the student exhibits 
facility with conceptual skills as well as technical. He may be capable 
of the full range of aesthetic experiences. Piaget recognized from his 
observations that all strands of intellection do not develop in a regular 
manner. Similarly, it may be that aesthetic development progresses in 
halts and spurts; the student may be well into the abstract stage and yet 
not have the fusion-emotional experiences which are typical of conceptual 
activity. Piaget called this type of time lag decalage.88 The following 
model shows the ideal relations between the aesthetic and cognitive 
strands. (See p. 68.) Variability of development should be accepted as 
the rule rather than as the exception. The uniqueness of each individual 
is attributed, in part, to the infinite number of decalages among the 
developmental domains. 
Discussion of the Model 
The model has four main headings: Piagetian stage (cognitive), type 
of aesthetic experience, aesthetic stage of development, and theorist. 
Each heading forms a column below it. Underneath the heading "Piagetian 
stages (cognitive)," appear the chronological divisions of intellectual 
development from infancy through adolescence. Each chronological division 
refers to a cluster of intellectual skills which are mastered by the child 
before moving into the next division. During the sensori-motor stage 
^Harold Taylor, Art and the Intellect (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1960), p. 77. 
88Rower et al., Understanding Intellectual Development, p. 35. 
Piagetian Stage 
(Cognitive) 
Type of Aesthetic Experience Aesthetic Stage of 
Development 
Theorist 
early - none Mimesis- Plato 
Sensori-Motor< 
late 
Concrete 
Pre-Abstract-
Abstract -
- motor-sensory 
withdrawal 
renewal-
i i 
r—t- fusion-emotional 
-Play-Impulse 
•Discovery of Form 
-Manipulation of Form 
•Symbolism of Art 
Fig. 8. 
A Parallel Model of Cognitive and Aesthetic Development 
Schiller 
Read 
-Dewey 
Langer 
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(which for purposes of this model has been divided into an early or in­
fantile period, and a late or pre-operational period), the child recog­
nizes and uses the senses and the large muscle groups. He learns to use 
the body as a machine, but the mind, while exhibiting self-consciousness, 
is not capable of "if-then" logic. This "if-then" type of cognitive 
operation characterizes the concrete stage. The pre-abstract stage 
heralds the child's entrance into the world of ideas. The ability to 
deal with experiences as extensions of concepts, that is, to mentally 
postulate acts toward a goal and their consequences, belongs to the 
adolescent who has moved into the abstract stage of cognitive development. 
Under the heading "type of aesthetic experience," there are five 
categories—none, motor-sensory, withdrawal, renewal, and fusion-
emotional. It is posited that each of these aesthetic stages emerges in 
conjunction with one of the cognitive stages of development. Like the 
cognitive divisions, each emerging aesthetic experience subtends its pre­
decessors; that is, once a child is capable of a motor-sensory experience, 
he does not cease to enjoy art in that manner when he experiences with­
drawal. It is important to note that although each type of aesthetic 
experience is allied with one cognitive stage, its appearance does not 
depend upon the mastery of the cognitive stage with which it is linked. 
The last two headings of the model include hallmark characteristics 
of each aesthetic stage of development and the writer who is given credit 
for theories bearing on that stage. Here one must recall that each 
theorist viewed his or her theory as a complete set of propositions about 
the nature of art, not as components of a larger framework. Plato, for 
example, theorized that art imitates nature; yet the archetype of mimesis 
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fits the developmental model at its earliest stage. As an archetype, 
mimesis has survived the test of time, although time has also proved it 
inadequate to explain fully the causes and consequences of art. However, 
mimesis has shaped our thinking about art, and in doing so shaped it at 
the theoretical as well as the practical. Modern theories also function 
as archetypes, and serve nicely to illustrate the developmental model as 
well as to illustrate the evolution of art forms in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
If one reads from left to right across the divisions of each column, 
a relationship between each column is readily accomplished. Starting 
with the final category under Piagetian stage, it can be seen that the 
abstract stage is allied with the fusion-emotional aesthetic experience. 
The aesthetic stage of development which may be expected of an adolescent 
in the abstract stage is symbolism of art--and if one wishes for a fur­
ther explanation of how aesthetic theory views symbolism, one is directed 
by the model to read the works of Suzanne Langer. The model works this 
way in all categories. 
If, however, one reads downward through column two, "types of 
aesthetic experience," some ambiguity may be encountered which it is the 
purpose of this discussion to illuminate. It may be seen that the late 
sensori-motor cognitive stage is linked both to the motor-sensory and 
withdrawal types of aesthetic experiences. In the model, each type of 
aesthetic experience is framed by a rectangle, the name of which appears 
in the upper-left-hand corner. The use of the rectangle was not acciden­
tal, nor was the use of the word "frame." In the same sense that a paint­
ing or a photograph is framed in order to protect it from the environment 
and enhance its appearance to the viewer, so too the types of aesthetic 
experience categories have each been framed with overlapping rectangles. 
Metaphorically, this allows the reader to consider the aesthetic experi­
ence as separate from total experience, as a thing or event to be cher­
ished, protected, and enhanced. It is the most important part of the 
model, because it is the part that is most real. Each of us secretly 
harbors the notion that the aesthetic experience is the motivator which 
makes other realms of being--the political, educational, economic, 
familial--worth the risk, worth the pain, worth enduring at all. 
Consider now the size and proximity of the frames for the types of 
aesthetic experiences. Notice that the motor-sensory, the withdrawal, 
and the renewal types are all fairly close to each other and have frames 
which extend all the way from their emergence through the abstract stage. 
On the other hand, the fusion-emotional stage is separated from the 
others by a little space, and its frame is smaller. This is to suggest 
that the fusion-emotional experience is a rare and precious event for 
the individual (if it happens at all — like the abstract stage of intel­
lectual development, some individuals may never "get there"), coming 
later in life when the emotional and intellectual capacities are in full 
maturity. The aesthetic state of which Schiller wrote negates the 
emotional and rational aspects of mentation. This type of aesthetic ex­
perience must stand a little apart, a bit unique. It is the joy we seek 
but rarely find, the release and fulfillment which elude us. The fusion-
emotional state may be said to be closely identified with moksha--
liberation; it may be said to be the ultimate teacher, the living proof 
that ecstasy lies within the grasp of each of us willing to give the very 
soul to art. 
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The zetetic models mentioned previously attempt to demonstrate the 
unfolding of events in four dimensions. The following model approximates 
the attempt at cinematic accuracy, in that it shows various aesthetic ex­
periences in the life of a child from infancy through adolescence. 
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This is Danny. 
ra 
Like most babies, he's busy Learning. 
Now he can see, hear, touch, taste--
smelL and wiggle. 
Soon he learns that if he copies some sounds, 
some actions, 
He'lL get what he needs. 
And he'LL feeL pretty good! 
Here's Danny again, a littLe older. 
He can move things, stack things, climb. 
Sometimes he feels pretty goodi 
Here's Danny in his room. 
Mom turns up the stereo. . . 
And that feels pretty goodi 
Here's Danny in Day Care. 
Sometimes they let him listen to the record player 
Once he thought the music came from. . . 
inside his head. 
Danny is in first grade now. One day some people 
came and did a play. 
In the play, a little boy ran away from home. 
Danny was afraid. When the little boy went 
back home, Danny was glad. 
He knew it was just a play, but still. . . 
He felt pretty good. 
In fourth grade, Danny's art teacher 
showed his class a painting. 
There were a number of squares in it. 
Danny decided the painting was much like the 
music he heard Tuesday. It was a Rondo. 
Danny could always tell when the first tune 
returned, even though there were several 
other melodies in between. 
Later, Danny drew a picture of his own about 
the painting with the squares and the Rondo. 
There it is. . . 
And he felt realLy goodi 
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A young woman came to see Danny's seventh 
grade class. She had on an old-fashioned dress, 
and used old-fashioned words. 
0 
She played a dulcimer. She sang about how her 
ancestors fled to the mountains to escape the 
Redcoats. 
They endured disease and famine. 
They survived Indian raids and frigid winters. 
Their babies died: their horses and 
cattle were stolen or killed by wild 
animals. 
Danny became part of that song. He wished 
he could fight the Indians. He wanted to make 
the sick babies well. He felt afraid. . .he feLt 
cold. . . he feit sad. 
But a little later, when he was all alone, he 
didn't feel bad. . . 
He felt very, very good. . . 
And very, very different from the 
Danny he knew. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The problem which the study addressed was the search for order, se­
quence, and proof in aesthetic inquiry. The working hypothesis of the 
study was that it was possible to create a new model to assist curriculum 
design which retained the flavor of artistic and literary criticism yet 
embodied the order, sequence, and proof required by educational research. 
Three models served as examples of good critical design. The critical 
systems of Krutch, Abrams, and Meyer provided the methodology for the 
creation of the model which was eventually presented in Chapter Three. 
The archetypes which the systems represented were personal involvement 
with the art form, the relationship of work of art to the artist, audi­
ence, and the universe of ideas, and the ambiguity or flexibility of the 
work of art. The new conceptual framework developed in the study was 
fashioned with these three archetypes in mind. In addition to assisting 
with the development of the new model, these critical systems themselves 
deserve notice inasmuch as they should help educators evaluate the 
aesthetic curriculum and devise new philosophies and programs for the 
entire educational endeavor. 
The significance of the study rested in its attempt to present in­
formation about the developmental nature of the aesthetic experience, and 
thereby validate that type of experience as the foundation of the 
aesthetic curriculum. The study was also significant in that it 
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encouraged the development of perceptual and affective skills as well as 
technical and logical skills. The study also promoted the self-knowledge 
of the creative capacities and treated the aesthetic experience as a per­
vasive event in schooling. Since the study has been placed in the area 
of educational philosophy rather than in one of the fine arts, it was 
hoped that it would bring the aesthetic dimension of the curriculum to 
the attention of the general educator. The study should contribute to 
the aesthetic life of the reader; thus the format includes anecdotes and 
illustrations as well as text. 
The definitions in Chapter One formed an introduction to the two 
final essays in the chapter. These essays functioned as position papers 
as well as exploratory exercises in aesthetic theory. Praxis, metaphor, 
and archetype are concepts which form a core of understanding in aesthetic 
education. The transdisciplinary curriculum is a desired outcome as this 
core of understanding is shared among educators. The section on models 
and design was included as a means to reduce conflict among members of a 
core group. The design of models reflects archetypes which signify hid­
den value statements and philosophical positions. Illuminating the dif­
ferences in the way models are viewed contributes to understanding among 
individuals working toward the transdisciplinary curriculum. 
Praxis had been defined as reflective action, an indispensable out­
come of an aesthetic education. Self-knowledge may be said to depend 
upon reflective action. The teacher aware of the model of developmental 
aesthetic stages will constantly reflect upon and act upon students' 
experiences and perceptions in light of those stages, and shape the stu­
dents' future experiences to enhance the stage in which each appears to 
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be. Like the Piagetian model, the move from one aesthetic stage to the 
next can not be aided or hastened. The capacity for the fusion-emotional 
stage remains linked to the psycho-emotional development of the individual 
and his awareness of aesthetic form. Those who build intense identity 
links with art forms will emerge from the fusion-emotional experience in 
a reflective stage of mind, with the determination to seek that stage 
again. 
The Aesthetic Dimension in Education focused upon the realm of 
theory and the realm of experience. Aesthetic theory was seen as a 
diverse set of organizing principles treating the creation and criticism 
of art forms. The perception of form, the social referents of art, and 
the efficacy of expression are each premises of major schools of thought 
within aesthetic philosophy. The use of technical language, the relating 
of a work of art to audience, performer, and universal ideas, and the 
expansion of traditional aesthetics to include human endeavors other than 
art are the concerns of aesthetic criticism, the principal way in which 
aesthetic theory is presented to readers. Dewey and Beardsley explored 
common territory in their discussions of aesthetic theory and experience, 
and Sontag, in her literary criticism, postulated a relationship between 
the aesthetic experience and moral judgment. 
The literature review established the existence of families of 
scholarship in which the individual authors or critics were linked by 
ideas or theories held in common or proceeding from one another. In the 
section on aesthetic criticism as a methodology, several models of criti­
cism were examined and two were validated as systems of research suitable 
for the aesthetic curriculum. The model based on the writings of Joseph 
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Wood Krutch placed critical writings on a continuum of personal involve­
ment with the art form. The three positions on Krutch's continuum were 
interpretation, impression, and impersonality. The critical model of 
Leonard B. Meyer was offered as an example of an impersonal or formalist 
style. M. H. Abrams' system for criticism, a four-pole model, is an 
example of the interpretive mode. John Ruskin was mentioned as an author 
using the impressionist method of criticism. Six prescriptions were 
given as a guide to researchers using an aesthetic methodology. The 
writer should 1) attempt vivid description through language, 2) system­
atize the application of metaphors, anecdotes, definitions, and models, 
3) attend to the value base of the metaphors, etc., 4) forge conclusions 
based upon comparisons between the educational equivalents of Abrams1 
four poles, 5) frame these conclusions in a conceptual model or framework, 
and 6) infuse the model with ambiguity or flexibility to encourage its 
creative application. 
The essay Creativity and Hedonism focused on the interrelationships 
between modes of perception, the artistic process, and the artistic pro­
duct. Altered states of perception were viewed as natural adjuncts to 
the creative process. The traditional emphasis by school arts programs 
on artistic products was reviewed and judged insufficient for the trans-
disciplinary curriculum. This statement was supported by the revisionist 
aesthetic educators Eisner and Beittel. Hedonism was described as the 
valuing of the transient pleasures which accompany the aesthetic experi­
ence. The hedonistic view of morality was traced from Augustine and 
Aquinas through Hume and Bentham to Watts and Leonard. The concept of 
pleasure and ecstasy as constituents of an aesthetic education was seen 
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to have its enemies among those who would wish to keep education as it is. 
Hedonism was also related to the psychological construct of motivation. 
In the final essay of the literature review, aesthetic theory was 
applied to the social research of Seymour Sarason. It was demonstrated 
that a number of rationales which formed the basis of change for the Yale 
Psycho-Educational Clinic were closely related to the hallmarks of the 
aesthetic experience as described by Beardsley. The essay itself followed 
Abrams' model in order to show that social as well as artistic and edu­
cational settings were appropriate subjects for aesthetic criticism. 
Chapter Three used the critical models of Krutch and Abrams to out­
line a new conceptual framework for aesthetic education. This new model 
utilized five theories of art from the writings of Plato, Schiller, Read, 
Dewey, and Langer. Each theory was shown to have had a relationship with 
the chronological aesthetic stages of development. These aesthetic 
stages corresponded to the Piegetian stages of cognitive development but 
did not depend upon the completion of the cognitive stages for their pro­
gression. In relation to the five postulated stages, four types of 
aesthetic experiences were viewed as typical to each aesthetic develop­
mental stage. Each type of experience characteristically happened during 
an aesthetic stage and persisted throughout the remainder of the child's 
aesthetic development. 
The description of the four types of aesthetic experience and how 
each relates to the contemporary views of the five historical theories 
formed the introduction to the model. The concept of decalage or time 
lag between strands of development was introduced to emphasize the flexi­
bility and deliberate ambiguity of the model. The model should be 
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expected to serve as a guide to a general understanding of the types of 
aesthetic experiences and comprehension of aesthetic phenomena, as an 
outline of how these understandings progress in relation to cognitive 
abilities, and as a framework for further scholarship in developmental 
aesthetics. The illustrations following the discussion offer a different 
perspective on the model. The visual representations of events which 
might hypothetically have contributed to the creation of the model seemed 
to be an efficacious method of allowing the reader entree into the spec­
trum of observations which the writer made as a preliminary to the study. 
Conclusions 
This study does not represent conventional statistical research. 
What it has done is to offer a new view of the aesthetic foundations of 
education, using forms of critical inquiry usually associated with liter­
ary or artistic criticism. Regardless of the methodology of an inquiry, 
or its intent, some statement of conclusion is necessary and appropriate. 
From the speculations and facts which support them, it is concluded that: 
1. It is possible to fashion a method of aesthetic inquiry which 
retains the flavor of artistic and literary criticism yet embodies the 
sequence, order, and proof which educational research requires. 
2. A method of artistic inquiry should be based upon comparisons 
between and among four poles or aspects of schooling: the teacher, the 
students, the educational setting, and selected ideas from the whole of 
educational philosophy. 
3. Comparisons should be made in a narrative essay, the styles of 
which may be impersonal (formalistic), impressionistic (personal 
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expressions of opinion), or interpretive (social referents). 
4. The style of the narrative combined all three of the above 
orientations, or may select from among them. The writer should stipulate 
which style he chooses, or otherwise make his choice apparent. 
5. It is possible, through this kind of critical endeavor, to 
fashion conceptual frameworks which serve to organize knowledge of a 
particular phenomenon (first-order models) or to serve as heuristic de­
vices for other researchers interested in that phenomenon (second-order 
models). 
6. The conceptual framework presented in this study used artistic 
and literary methods of inquiry to postulate the existence of develop­
mental stages of aesthetic awareness. 
7. The postulated stages were derived from observation of the 
aesthetic experiences of many children and adolescents. The experiences 
of these students were compared with the educational environments in 
which they occurred, the aesthetic involvement of their teachers and the 
observer, and selected ideas from educational philosophy, psychology, 
and aesthetic theory. 
8. The style of interpretation was chosen for this study. It is 
recommended that further research in developmental aesthetics adopts 
this style. While personal opinion and formalistic studies may be in­
teresting, each alone cannot fulfill the conditions of proof, order, and 
sequence. What is currently needed in aesthetic education is work in 
the foundations area. Interpretive inquiry fulfills that need. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
The Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Experience 
As outlined in Chapter Three, Panzarella has noted that there are 
at least four types of aesthetic experiences. His conclusions were drawn 
from observations of subjects undergoing such experiences as well as from 
the verbal and written reports of those persons he observed. Since his 
studies were done with adults, it would be a logical extension of his 
study and this to observe and record the behavior of children and adoles­
cents involved in encounters with art. Written reports by children may 
lack the cogency and descriptiveness of adults; it may be wiser to rely 
on verbal descriptions of what passes through their consciousnesses dur­
ing the aesthetic experience. 
In encouraging children to talk about art, there are several pro­
grammatic steps to follow and a number of attitudinal changes to watch as 
the steps are mounted and passed. First, children must develop a des­
criptive vocabulary to deal with the art object and their feelings about 
it. Often, culturally imposed paradigms are subtly substituted to 
countervent original or divergent subject-object emotional links a child 
might make. For example, children are encouraged to think of the "cool" 
colors—blue, green, and purple--as being restful and as signifying peace 
and repose. Yet those who walk through a mountain forest on an early 
summer day may become aware of the paradoxes presented by the "burning" 
blue of the sky overhead, the "fiery" green of the transparent leaves in 
motion upon the wind, and the "riotous" purple profesion of violets along 
the streambank. Similar cultural-artistic biases occur in music—for 
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example, the standard equations of minor keys = sad, major keys = happy. 
Educators who plan to equip their students with an aesthetic vocabulary 
should guard against such dictums which eventually form catechisms of 
cultural-artistic bias. 
A second programmatic step in assisting the study of aesthetic ex­
periences with children is to develop strong, positive identity links 
between the child and the art work. In doing this, it should be apparent 
that certain forms and styles of art are more suitable to the postulated 
aesthetic stages than others. While the entire ballet Petrouchka may 
have its fascination for the adult connoisseur, the music in its entirety 
may make severe demands upon even the most imaginative younger mind. 
Robbed of its dance, Petrouchka becomes an outline. To fill in such an 
outline without the verbal or imagic vocabulary mentioned above becomes 
a task more likely doomed to failure than destined for fulfillment. The 
study of aesthetic experiences among children should take place in the 
milieu most suited to the genre--i.e., viewing a ballet in a theatre 
rather than merely listening to its score in the classroom, or creating 
movements to accompany the score rather than fidgeting in a desk while it 
is played. The social-active dimension of the aesthetic experience de­
mands that in order to insure positive identity links with art, the child 
must engage as much of the self as possible, as early as possible. Trans­
ference of actual involvement to hypothetical involvement is one long-
range intent of the aesthetic education. The child moves from super­
ficial, external involvement with art on the most simple level through an 
internalization which allows him access to mental images which enhance 
the art object and at the same time prompt the creative faculties. 
Adolescents may sustain the mental images which allow them not merely to 
read, but to "read into" novels. If children of earlier aesthetic stages 
can not read novel-length literature, it is probably less due to a "short 
attention span" than it is to the development of hypothetical identifica­
tion which characterizes the later aesthetic stage. The identity link, 
then, between the child or adolescent and the art object is distinguished 
by 1) early physical involvement with the mechanical aspects of the artis­
tic genres, 2) the eventual development of the imaginative mental capaci­
ties which allow the child to "fill in the blanks" in art forms requiring 
it, and 3) the reliance upon such mental images to spur the child on to 
experimentation with creative forms which require originality, technique, 
and expressiveness. 
A third programmatic recommendation is in the dimension of value. 
Often a child is reluctant to express ideas because he has been ridiculed 
or because he may appear silly. In the realm of art, where all things 
are possible (or at least probable), insane ideas and expressions have as 
much place as the recondite or abstruse. Art is the domain of nonsense 
and nonsequitur as well as of theory and technique. A playful, open con­
firming approach to discussions with children about art will meet with 
success. Often their ideas contain fresh and poignant views which adults 
with years of experience and training may overlook. The important thing 
to keep in mind while working with children of earlier developmental 
stages is that they express themselves using their newly-acquired tech­
nical vocabulary, and that they do so under conditions of excitement, 
encouragement, and experimentation. 
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Some specific research possibilities are suggested here to accompany 
these programmatic recommendations, as well as some directions which 
might be helpful in the development of curricular material. First, in 
the area of the descriptive vocabulary, curriculum development might 
1. Establish a list of essential skills and concepts in each of the 
arts for each postulated aesthetic stage; 
2. Derive a list of descriptive words, phrases, and expressions 
which might be desirable for children to use at each stage; 
3. Observe children's aesthetic experiences using a checklist in­
cluding these words, phrases, and expressions to note the frequency and 
distribution of the words during the experience; 
4. Constantly update and revise the checklist to include motor 
responses, facial expressions, and gestures which occur during the 
aesthetic experience. 
Second, vis-a-vis the recommendation "to develop strong identity 
links between the child and the art work," curriculum observers and 
writers might wish to pursue longitudinal case studies of several children 
using the checklist suggested above, keeping a log of the children's sig­
nificant encounters with art forms. The log information might include 
1. The genre, title, and author, composer, or creator of the art 
work; 
2. The setting in which the child encountered the work; 
3. Significant social data pertaining to the encounter, e.g., was 
the child alone or with parents, peers, or a teacher; was the experience 
self-initiated, teacher-directed or the product of chance; who performed 
and through which medium; was the encounter generally praised, denigrated, 
or neutralized by the child in his reflections upon it; 
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4. The nature and intensity of the observed aesthetic experience 
compared with the child's assessment of his experience; 
5. Descriptive vocabulary used by the child in a brief post-
encounter interview; 
6. A short narrative written by the researcher evaluating the 
above data and placing it in perspective to the child's progress through 
the postulated stages of the model. 
The curriculum researcher should infer that as the child matures, 
some regular patterns of aesthetic experience will emerge. The selection 
by the child of experiences which fulfill his desire to hear or view cer­
tain types of art may be construed as evidence that he has developed an 
identity link with that type of art. In addition to providing a clue 
about aesthetic development of the child, this data may also contribute 
to a personality profile of the child. The prudent researcher will ex­
plore the value dimension of such repeated choices by careful examination 
of verbal and written reports of the student. Bias words, judgment 
phrases, and emotionally charged statements should be critiqued as well 
as words and phrases from the checklist mentioned above. 
Some other research possibilities in the phenomenology of the 
aesthetic experience (apart from specific investigations in curriculum) 
are: 
1. Case studies in the creation of aesthetic settings focusing upon 
critical incidents changing the direction of the setting or profoundly 
affecting the individuals within the group; 
2. Narratives which concentrate upon the role of the facilitator as 
perceived by him and as perceived by members of the aesthetic setting (a 
91 
good example of this type of narrative is Season with Solti by William 
Barry Furlong. The book tells the story of the performance season of 
Georg Solti and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, concentrating upon the 
interaction of the conductors, the musicians and their families, the 
managers, entrepreneurs, and financiers of a major American symphony 
orchestra; 
3. Studies which outline the aesthetic development of individuals 
of diverse backgrounds--statistical researchers, social researchers, and 
arts educators—who may be initiating transdisciplinary programs in 
business, schools, or community arts settings; 
4. Studies which work to confirm the existence of aesthetic devel­
opmental stages in mentally or orthopedically handicapped students. 
Theoretical and Critical Studies 
Another direction which further research in aesthetic education 
could take is through the lens of teleological criticism. As alluded to 
in Chapter One (The Aesthetic Dimension in Education: Theory and Experi­
ence) , certain art forms are judged suitable for use in the school curric­
ulum and some forms are not. The constraints of time, resources, and 
class size mitigate against some discarded forms, but there seems to be 
no clear purpose for excluding the rest, unless one accepts "taste" as a 
criterion. The trombone choir and the barbershop quartet served as 
examples. Other examples might be recorder ensembles, medieval dance, 
Jewish music, "found" art and guerilla theatre. Less specific artistic 
endeavors excluded from the curriculum are the theory and criticism of 
art and settings which exist to showcase original creations of students 
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(apart from painting, drawing, and sculpting classes). In music, drama, 
and dance there seems to be a dearth of classes solely for the production 
of original student works. One must discount large metropolitan high 
schools such as the High School of the Performing Arts in Brooklyn, New 
York, and North Miami Beach High School in Miami, Florida. Numbers of 
students well prepared to undertake original works abound in those areas. 
One may argue that the number of students able to participate in such 
settings in smaller urban and rural schools might be painfully small. 
However, one begs the question, is "numbers" really a justification for 
offering or not offering courses or experiences which students deserve 
and want? Those who are able to participate should be able to do so, 
even under the severest constraints of teacher allotment and scheduling, 
in the strong hope that others not equal to the task may follow and be 
inspired. 
The criticism of educational purposes may be crystallized around 
Habermas' writings on the reasons why humans gather and use information. 
To briefly paraphrase, these reasons are 1) gathering information or 
knowledge for the purpose of controlling or manipulating people and 
situations, 2) gathering knowledge for the purpose of understanding 
social-cultural phenomena (hermeneutics), and 3) gathering knowledge for 
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the purpose of emancipation or liberation of human potential. These 
parameters may be viewed as inclusive, exclusive, or sequential. In a 
sequential relationship, the teacher of art first attempts to control the 
techniques the student learns in order for the student to later understand 
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Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. 
Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 35. 
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how those techniques may be used to liberate the student and potential 
audiences from the faded stereotypes and tired metaphors of which Broudy 
wrote. In an exclusive relationship, teachers of art may concentrate on 
only one aspect or parameter—let us say, control—and view the others 
as peripheral or unimportant to the artistic process. Beittel, for 
example, would fall under the general heading of a liberationist with an 
exclusive view of the purpose of teaching art--the liberation of human 
potential. Those who hold the view that art has no political dimension 
(or should have none) fall into the category of exclusive hermeneutics. 
By contrast, a Marxist aesthetic, such as espoused by Marcuse, would re­
ject this view and its reliance upon a single, exclusive view of Habermas1 
model. Rather, the New Aesthetic--often termed "Third Wave"—adopts the 
despairing, near-existential inclusive view that art is doomed to work 
through all three parameters of Habermas1 model. Although the artist may 
genuinely try to negate the constraints of society upon his work and con­
sequently liberate the audience's consciousness from similar constraints, 
he still is engaged in an act of control, of which little or no under­
standing exists at any level. 
A speculative model of the relationships between Habermas' paradigm 
and the dimensions of artistic endeavor may help to enlighten the teleo-
logical realm of art curricula. If criticism, art-in-process, and re­
creative art are arbitrarily postulated as the three purposive dimensions 
of art--in criticism, to understand; in re-creative art, to gain tech­
nical control; and in art-in-process to liberate the potential of the 
creator—then links between and among elements of the model appear as 
such: 
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Dimensions Criticism 
Persons 
Purposes • 
theorists, critics, 
students of post-
creative literature 
Understanding 
Re-creative Art-
musicians, dancers, 
"actors, directors 
Control 
-Art-in-Process 
playwrights, 
"poets, painters, 
novelists, 
choreographers, 
composers 
Liberation 
Fig. 15. 
The Dimensions of Artistic Endeavor 
Eventually, through dialogue among the persons in each of the three 
dimensions, arts curricula and programs should evolve to look like this: 
Art-in-Process 
Criticism 
Re-creative Art 
/ 
Fig. 16. 
Arts Curricula and Programs 
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This should be a model which school art programs could philosophically 
support and realistically implement. From the small, dense, "hot" core 
where the purposes, dimensions, and people coincide, there should emerge 
exciting possibilities for inquiry of critical and theoretical varieties. 
Habermas' model lends itself especially well to teleological criti­
cism. Further research in aesthetic education should examine the politi­
cal dimensions of programs in the arts and could address questions such 
as 
1. What are the purposes of an aesthetic education as seen by 
school administrators, college professors, performing artists, public 
school teachers, parents, and students? 
2. What are the areas of congruency and disparity among these 
views? 
3. Why are some art forms excluded from the school curriculum and 
what are the historical, social, political, and economic reasons for 
their exclusion? 
4. How should school arts curricula be evaluated: in terms of the 
creative, re-creative, or critical output of the students? 
5. How can social research and curriculum theorizing interface 
with aesthetics? Does art philosophy currently have the capacity to 
deal with real school issues or must other methods of research suffice? 
6. How can key persons in school leadership positions be moved to 
make financial commitments to aesthetic education, and what strategies 
should arts educators employ to guarantee, these commitments? 
7. What are the moral dimensions of taste, and what are their roles 
in the development of an arts curriculum? 
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8. What are the philosophical implications of statistical research 
in the arts? How does "hard" research mitigate for or against the aims 
of an aesthetic education? 
Finally, Maxine Greene offers a caution to those.scholars pursuing 
aesthetic studies. To gain understanding of forms and lose the capacity 
to enjoy them is a great danger inherent in arts scholarship. 
It is true that, in order to penetrate and to realize a work of 
art, individuals must be equipped with a degree of cognitive 
understanding: they ought to have some acquaintance with figura­
tive language in the case of literature, with the distinctively 
dynamic images created in dance, with the tonal structures and 
sound relations in music, with plastic and pictorial values in 
painting. It is possible, however, to understand the metaphor 
... so well that one can write scholarly treatises on figures 
and symbols—and be incapable of aesthetic involvement.^ 
^Greene, Landscapes, p. 179-180. 
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